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SCOTTSBORO 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One  of  America‘s  most  infamous  legal  episodes  began  on  March  25, 
1931.  Nine black youths from Georgia and Tennessee were accused of raping 
two white women on a freight train in northern Alabama.  In hastily arranged 
trials, eight  of them received  death sentences.  Their appeals, retrials, and 
subsequent legal proceedings riveted the attention of the nation and the world 
and ultimately produced two Supreme Court rulings in their favor and nearly 
twenty years of legal wrangling. 
Known  to  history  as  Scottsboro,  this  episode  teaches  several  lessons 
relevant  to  students  of  American  constitutional  law  and  history.    The 
Scottsboro Cases illuminate why the modern revolution in American criminal 
procedure began mainly with cases involving black criminal defendants from 
the  South.    The  episode  also  reveals  how  Supreme  Court  interventions  in 
southern  race  cases  tended  to  incite  political  backlashes  that  undermined 
implementation  of  the  Court‘s  decisions—thus  making  Scottsboro  an 
important  forerunner  of  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education.
1  The competition 
between the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the International Labor Defense (ILD) for the right to represent 
the Scottsboro defendants on appeal illustrates competing perspectives on the 
use of law as a method of social reform —a debate that reverberates to the 
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present day.
2  The limited impact of the Supreme Court rulings in Scottsboro 
on the southern criminal justice system sheds light on another great debate in 
American constitutional law and theory: the capacity of the Supreme Court to 
compel social change.
3  Finally, the Scottsboro litigation illustrates not only 
some of the indirect benefits of litigation as a method of organizing social  
protest,
4 but also the intangible costs generated by Court victories that fail to 
appreciably change oppressive social practices.
5 
II.  THE STORY OF SCOTTSBORO 
A.  A Fateful Train Ride 
The freight train left Chattanooga for Memphis at 10:20 a.m. on March 25, 
1931.    Thirty  minutes  after  it  had  pulled  out  of  Stevenson,  Alabama,  the 
stationmaster there saw a group of white hoboes walking along the train tracks 
back toward the station.  They told him that several black youths had thrown 
them off the train after a fight.  The stationmaster telephoned ahead to the next 
stop,  Scottsboro,  but  the  train  had  already  passed  through.    It  was  finally 
stopped at Paint Rock, where a sheriff‘s posse discovered nine black youngsters 
and, to everyone‘s surprise, two young white women dressed in men‘s overalls.
6 
The nine blacks, known to history as the Scottsboro boys, ranged in age 
from  thirteen  to  twenty.    Five  of  them  were  from  Georgia,  though  they 
claimed not to know one another.  The other four did know one another; they 
were from Chattanooga, Tennessee.  All of the nine were vagrants, and most 
of them were illiterate. 
Twenty minutes after the train had been stopped, one of the women, Ruby 
 
2. See, e.g., Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 151 (2009); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, 
and  the  Law:  The  Case  of  Affirmative  Action,  105  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1436  (2005);  William  N. 
Eskridge,  Jr.,  Some  Effects  of  Identity-Based  Social  Movements  on  Constitutional  Law  in  the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).  
3. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF 
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 192–209 (1978); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN  COURTS  BRING  ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?  (1st  ed.  1991);  Bradley  C.  Canon, The  Supreme 
Court  and  Policy  Reform:  The  Hollow  Hope  Revisited,  in  LEVERAGING  THE  LAW:  USING  THE 
COURTS  TO  ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 215 (David  A. Schultz  ed., 1998); JEFFREY  A. SEGAL  & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 333–55 (1993); STEPHEN 
L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970). 
4. HANDLER,  SOCIAL  MOVEMENTS  AND  THE  LEGAL  SYSTEM,  supra  note  3,  at  214–22 
(discussing  indirect  benefits  from  law  reform  activity);  KLARMAN,  FROM  JIM  CROW  TO  CIVIL 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 93–95, 162–67, 284–86, 365–69, 463–68; MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS 
AT  WORK:  PAY  EQUITY  REFORM  AND  THE  POLITICS  OF  LEGAL  MOBILIZATION  10,  56–57,  279 
(1994) (discussing indirect benefits of reform litigation activity). 
5. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 95–96, 282–84. 
6. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 3–5 (rev. ed. 1979); 
JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 3–4 (1994). 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  381 
Bates, called over a posse member and told him that she and her companion, 
Victoria  Price,  had  been  gang-raped  by  the  blacks.    The  boys  were 
immediately arrested and taken to the Scottsboro jail.  As the sheriff sent the 
women to two local doctors for medical examinations, news of the alleged 
attacks spread.  By day‘s end, a crowd of several hundred people had gathered 
outside of the jail, demanding that the ―niggers‖ be turned over for lynching.
7  
Sheriff M.L. Wann pleaded with the mob to allow the law to take its course 
and threatened to shoot anyone who rushed the jail.  He also telephoned the 
governor  for  assistance,  and  by  11:00 p.m.,  twenty-five  armed  guardsmen 
were on their way to Scottsboro.  To ensure the boys‘ safety, they were moved 
to  a  sturdier  jail  in  nearby  Etowah.    The  local  circuit  judge,  Alfred  E. 
Hawkins, convened a special session of the grand jury to indict them; local 
citizens complained of the five-day delay.  One local newspaper remarked, ―It 
is best for the county that these things be disposed of in a speedy manner as it 
gives no excuse for people taking the law into their own hands.‖
8 
A  decade  or two  earlier, black  men charged with raping  white  women 
under  similar  circumstances  might  well  have  been  executed  without  trial.  
Lynchings in the South peaked in the late 1880s and early 1890s, when well 
over a hundred were reported annually and in some years over two hundred.  
Most lynchings occurred in response to allegations of crime—usually murder 
or rape—though occasionally the alleged ―offense‖ was as minor as breach of 
racial  etiquette  or  general  uppityness.    Prior  to  World  War  I,  lynchings 
typically enjoyed the support of local communities; efforts to prosecute even 
known lynchers were rare, and convictions were virtually nonexistent.
9 
By  1930,  however,  the  number  of  reported  lynchings  had  declined 
dramatically—from an average of 187.5 per year in the 1890s to 16.8 in the 
later  years  of  the  1920s.
10  This decline was attributable to many factors, 
including the possibility of federal anti-lynching legislation, the diminishing 
insularity  of  the  South,  more  professional  law   enforcement,  and  better 
 
7. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 6–8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
8. Id. at 6–9, 16–17 n.11 (quoting the PROGRESSIVE  AGE (Scottsboro,  Ala.), Apr. 2, 1931) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 21–22.  
9. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 105; KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 118–19; see generally W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: 
GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880–1930 (1993); GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE 
CULTURE  OF  SEGREGATION  IN  THE  SOUTH,  1890–1940,  at  199–227  (1998);  LEON  F.  LITWACK, 
TROUBLE  IN  MIND:  BLACK SOUTHERNERS  IN  THE  AGE  OF JIM  CROW  280–325  (1998);  NEIL R. 
MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE  OF JIM CROW 224–56 (1989); 
ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING (1933); UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING 
IN THE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997) (discussing lynching in relation to racial violence, 
its regional and cultural contexts, and its legacy).  
10. RAPER, TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING, supra note 9, at 25, 46–47. 382  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
education.
11  But the decline in lynchings probably also depended on their 
replacement with speedy trials that reliably produced guilty verdicts, death 
sentences, and rapid executions.
12  Some jurisdictions actually enacted laws 
designed to prevent lynchings by providing for special terms of court to 
convene within days of alleged rapes and other incendiary crimes.
13  In many 
instances, law enforcement officers explicitly promised would-be lynch mobs 
that black defendants would be quickly tried and executed if the mob desisted, 
and prosecutors appealed to juries to convict in order to reward mobs for good 
behavior and thus encourage similar restraint in the future.
14 
In such cases, guilt or innocence usually mattered little.  As one whit e 
southerner  candidly  remarked  in  1933,  ―If  a  white  woman  is  prepared  to 
swear that a Negro either raped or attempted to rape her, we see to it that the 
Negro is executed.‖
15  Prevailing racial norms did not permit white jurors to 
believe a black man‘s word over that of a white woman; prevailing gender 
norms did not allow defense counsel to closely interrogate a white woman 
about allegations involving sex.  As one contemporary southern newspaper 
observed, the honor of a white woman was more important than the life of a 
black man.
16  And because most southern white men believed that black males 
secretly lusted after ―their‖ women, they generally found such rape allegations 
credible.    Congressman  George  Huddleston  of  Birmingham,  whom  the 
NAACP  initially  approached  to  represent  the  Scottsboro  boys  on  appeal, 
repulsed  the  overtures,  observing  that  they  had  been  ―found  riding  on  the 
same  freight  car  with  two  white  women,  and  that‘s  enough  for  me!‖
17  
Scottsboro  whites  told  an  investigator  from  the  American  Civil  Liberties 
 
11. See,  e.g.,  GUNNAR  MYRDAL,  AN  AMERICAN  DILEMMA:  THE  NEGRO  PROBLEM  AND 
MODERN  DEMOCRACY  565  (1944);  GEORGE  BROWN  TINDALL,  THE  EMERGENCE  OF  THE  NEW 
SOUTH 1913–1945, at 174, 554 (1967); Todd E.  Lewis, Mob Justice in the ―American  Congo‖: 
―Judge Lynch‖ in Arkansas During the Decade After World War I, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 156, 179–84 
(1993).   
12. On these  ―legal  lynchings,‖ see MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY, supra note 9, at 206–17; 
George C. Wright, By the Book: The Legal Executions of Kentucky Blacks, in UNDER SENTENCE OF 
DEATH, supra note 9, at 250–70. 
13. See, e.g., Bettis v. State, 261 S.W. 46, 47 (Ark. 1924); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 298 (1940); LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS 1874–1900, 
at 253 (1971). 
14. See, e.g., RICHARD C. CORTNER, A ―SCOTTSBORO‖ CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME 
COURT  AND  BROWN  V.  MISSISSIPPI  3–4,  8  (1986);  Anne  S.  Emanuel,  Lynching  and  the  Law  in 
Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 215, 228 (1996).  
15. John Gould Fletcher, Letter to the Editor, Is This the Voice of the South?, 137 NATION 734, 
734 (1933). 
16. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 134. 
17. Excerpt from a Confidential Report on the Scottsboro Cases (May 7, 1931), microformed 
on Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, pt. 6, reel 2, frames 
893–94 (August Meier ed., Univ. Publ‘ns of Am. 1982) [hereinafter NAACP Papers]. 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  383 
Union (ACLU) that, ―We white people just couldn‘t afford to let these niggers 
off because of the effect it would have on other niggers.‖
18 
The  Scottsboro  defendants  received  precisely  the  sort  of  ―justice‖  that 
often prevailed in trials that substituted for lynchings.  Both local newspapers 
treated  the  defendants  as  obviously  guilty  even  before  the  trial.    The 
hometown  newspaper  of  the  alleged  victims,  the  Huntsville  Daily  Times, 
―described the rapes as the most atrocious ever recorded in this part of the 
country, a wholesale debauching of society.‖
19  Judge Hawkins tried to assign 
all seven members of the Scottsboro bar to represent the defendants, but all 
but one of them declined.  That one was Milo Moody, nearly seventy years 
old  and  later  described  by  one  investigator  as  ―a  doddering,  extremely 
unreliable, senile individual who is losing whatever ability he once had.‖
20 
The trials began on April 6, just twelve days after the train incident.  A 
crowd  estimated  at  five  to  ten  thousand  gathered  outside  the  courthouse, 
which was protected by national guardsmen wielding machine guns.  Hawkins 
appointed as trial counsel a Tennessee lawyer, Stephen R. Roddy, who had 
been  sent  to  Scottsboro  by  the  defendants‘  families  to  look  after  their 
interests.  Roddy was an alcoholic, and one observer reported that ―he could 
scarcely  walk  straight‖  that  morning.
21  When  Roddy  objected  to  his 
appointment  on  the  grounds  that  he  was  unprepared  and  unfamiliar  with 
Alabama law, Hawkins appointed Moody, the local septuagenarian, to assist 
him.  Roddy was permitted less than half an hour with his clients before the 
trial  began.    Defense  counsel  moved  for  a  change  of  venue  based  on  the 
inflammatory  newspaper  coverage  and  the  attempted  lynching  of  the 
defendants.    But  Sheriff  Wann  now  denied  that  the  defendants  had  been 
threatened, and Judge Hawkins denied the motion.
22 
The state sought the death penalty against eight of the nine defendants —
all but the one who was identified as being only thirteen years old.  The nine 
were  tried  in  four  groups,  beginning  with  Clarence  Norris  and  Charley 
Weems.  Victoria Price was the main prosecution witness, and she testified 
that the black youths had thrown the white boys off the train and then gang-
raped her and Bates.  According to one secondhand account, Price testified 
 
18. Hollace  Ransdell,  Report  on  the  Scottsboro  Case  (May  27,  1931)  [hereinafter  Ransdell 
Report], microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 175. 
19. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Memorandum from Mrs. Hollace Ransdall [sic] on Visit to National Office on May 18, 
1931 (May 19, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 27; 
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 17–18; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, 
at 26.  
21. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  21–22  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted). 
22. Id. at 19–24. 384  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
―with such gusto, snap and wise-cracks, that the courtroom was often in a roar 
of laughter.‖
23 
Judge Hawkins blocked defense counsel‘s efforts to elicit admissions that 
the women were prostitutes and that they had had sexual intercourse with their 
boyfriends the night before the train incident, which could have explained the 
semen  found  in  their  vaginas  during  medical  examinations.    Testimony 
provided by the examining doctors raised serious doubts as to whether the 
girls had been raped: They were not hysterical when examined, nor had they 
incurred any serious physical injuries.  Moreover, Price had so little semen in 
her  vagina  that  a  sequential  rape  by  six  men,  as  she  alleged,  was  highly 
improbable.  Finally, the sperm found in the women was non-motile, which 
virtually  ruled  out  the  possibility  of  intercourse  within  the  preceding  few 
hours.  In their testimony, the two women also provided inconsistent accounts 
of various details of the incident, such as whether they had spoken with the 
white boys on the train and how long the interracial fracas had lasted.  One 
man present when the train was stopped testified that he had not heard Price 
make any rape allegations.
24 
However, the admission by Norris on cross-examination that the women 
had  been  raped  by  all  of  the  other  eight  defendants,  though  not  by  him, 
severely  undercut  his  defense.    (It  later  came  out  that  Sheriff  Wann  had 
warned Norris that he would be killed if he did not admit that the girls had 
been raped.)  Defense counsel prodded the illiterate and confused Norris to 
change his story, but he held firm.  The defense called no witnesses and made 
no closing argument.
25 
While the jury deliberated on the fate of Norris and Weems, the trial of 
Haywood Patterson began.  When the first jury r eturned to the courtroom to 
announce guilty verdicts and death sentences, crowds in and out of the 
courthouse  erupted  with  delight.    According  to  defense  lawyer  Roddy, 
―[i]nstantly, a wild and thunderous roar went up from the audience and was 
heard  by  those  in  the  Court  House  yard  where  thousands  took  up  the 
demonstration and carried it on for fifteen or twenty minutes.‖
26  Even though 
Patterson‘s jury heard this commotion, Judge Hawkins refused to declare a 
mistrial.
27 
The  prosecution‘s  case  grew  stronger  with  each  trial,  as  previously 
 
23. Ransdell Report, supra note 18, at frame 181; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 
6, at 24–26. 
24. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 26–30. 
25. Id. at 33–35. 
26. Letter from Stephen R. Roddy, Attorney, to the Friends and Relatives of the Nine Negro 
Boys Charged with Rape, in Jackson County, Alabama (Apr. 11, 1931),  microformed on NAACP 
Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frame 627. 
27. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 35–38.  2009]  SCOTTSBORO  385 
unhelpful  witnesses  were  dropped  and  the  alleged  victims  improved  their 
stories with each recounting.  Within a five-minute span on the witness stand, 
Patterson contradicted himself as to whether he had seen the girls being raped 
or indeed had seen them on the train at all.  Several of the other defendants 
also  testified  inconsistently.    After  less  than  twenty-five  minutes  of 
deliberation, the jury convicted Patterson and sentenced him to death.
28 
Five of the defendants were pros ecuted together in a third trial.  The 
state‘s case against them was even weaker because these defendants did not 
incriminate each other on cross-examination, the women were less certain in 
identifying them as the rapists, and one of the defendants was nearly blind 
while another had such a severe case of venereal disease that raping a woman 
would  have  been  very  difficult.    The  jury  nonetheless  returned  five  more 
death sentences.  Judge Hawkins declared a mistrial in the case of the last 
defendant, Roy Wright, when the jury could not agree on whether to sentence 
the  thirteen-year-old  to  life  imprisonment  or  to  death—a  sentence  the 
prosecution had not even sought.  None of the four trials lasted more than a 
few hours.
29 
B.  Representation on Appeal 
The Communist Party quickly realized the potential for propaganda and 
fund-raising afforded by the Scottsboro episode, which it saw as the Sacco 
and Vanzetti case of the 1930s.  Communists denounced the trials as ―legal 
lynchings‖ and assailed the ―parasite landlords and capitalist classes of the 
South.‖
30  Less radical voices also protested this ―barbarous penalty‖ imposed 
on eight black youngsters.
31  By contrast, the NAACP, which was generally 
reluctant to intervene in criminal cases unless reasonably certain that the  
defendants were innocent, was slow to act.  The NAACP‘s hesitation enabled 
the ILD, the  legal arm  of the Communist Party, to secure the  defendants‘ 
consent to its representing them.
32 
Stung  by  criticism  from  supporters  for  its  dilatory  response  and 
discovering that ―public interest is so deep that we cannot afford not to be in 
the case,‖ NAACP leaders aggressively challenged the ILD for control of the 
boys‘ appeals.
33  The NAACP convinced some black leaders in Chattanooga, 
 
28. Id. at 38–43; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 14–15. 
29. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 42–48. 
30. Id. at 49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. Id. at 50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Id. at 49–60; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 7–8, 25–29. 
33. Letter  from  Walter  White,  Secretary,  NAACP,  to  Bob  &  Herbert  (May  3,  1931), 
microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frame 829; see also Letter from Roy 
Wilkins,  Assistant  Secretary,  NAACP,  to  Walter  White,  Secretary,  NAACP  (May  7,  1931), 
microformed on id., frame 889 (noting that while the NAACP had been silent on the Scottsboro case, 386  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
which was home to several of the defendants, that communist involvement 
would  be  a  millstone  around  the  boys‘  necks,  and  the  defendants  were 
persuaded to retract their consent to ILD representation.  The ILD responded 
by publicly attacking the NAACP as ―[b]ourgeois [r]eformists‖ and ―secret 
allies of the lynchers‖ who would help ―lead the boys to the electric chair.‖
34  
The communists declared that the boys could be saved only by mass protest, 
not  by  appeals  to  the  ruling  class.    They  ridiculed  the  NAACP  for  its 
willingness  to  ―kiss  the  rope  that  hangs  their  brothers,  if  only  the  rope  is 
blessed by a ruling class judge,‖ and they accused the association generally of 
ignoring the interests of the black masses.
35 
In response, the NAACP accused the  communists of using the case for 
their own selfish advantage and warned that their incendiary rhetoric would 
harm the  defendants‘ chances  of  winning reversal on appeal  or securing a 
commutation of their sentences from the governor.  Walter White, the general 
secretary  of  the  NAACP,  told  the  mother  of  one  of  the  boys,  Eugene 
Williams, that ―the odds against her son were terrific at best—that when Red 
prejudice  was  added  to  Black,  she  would  practically  insure  her  boy‘s 
execution by remaining tied up with the Communists.‖
36  White even accused 
the communists of calculating that ―the boys  dead  will be  worth  more for 
propaganda purposes than alive.‖
37  By contrast, the NAACP‘s strategy  on 
appeal would be to hire an eminent white lawyer from the South who would 
avoid  publicity  and  try  to  win  reversal  or  commutation  on  narrow  legal 
grounds.
38 
 
the ILD and the Communist Party had been publicizing it and ―generally whooping it up‖ and that 
this was causing  ―no little embarrassment to the Association‖). 
34. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  56–57,  61–62  (citations  and  internal  quotation 
marks omitted). 
35. Id.  at  67 (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see  also Letter  from  William 
Patterson, Secretary, ILD, to NAACP (June 30, 1933), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 
17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frames 459–72 (arguing that the freedom of the Scottsboro boys could be won 
―only by rousing the Negro masses in alliance with the white workers to a relentless struggle against 
the whole system of national oppression of the Negro people,‖ and attacking the NAACP for trying 
to block such alliances while placing excessive faith in the courts).  
36. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Bob & Herbert, supra note 33, at frame 
826. 
37. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Messrs. Fort, Beddow & Ray (Aug. 19, 
1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 4, frame 146; see also Letter 
from  Walter  White,  Secretary,  NAACP,  to  Roy  Wilkins,  Assistant  Secretary,  NAACP  (May  13, 
1931), microformed on id., at reel 2, frames 973–75 (noting that the NAACP had cause to believe 
that ―some of the Communists [felt] that if the boys [were] electrocuted after at least a semblance of 
legal  action  to  save  them  [had]  been  made,  it  [would  have  been]  even  more  valuable  for  the 
Communists in their appeal to Negroes for support‖).   
38. Murder from Afar, PHILA. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1931, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra 
note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 351; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 69–72; see also Letter 
from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Ludwell ―Lud‖ Denny (Apr. 29, 1931), microformed on 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  387 
NAACP  leaders  were  torn  between  wanting  not  to  jeopardize  the 
defendants‘ chances of winning the support of moderate whites in the South 
and wishing not to alienate those of its members who demanded a vociferous 
condemnation of the white South for its willingness to execute the defendants 
on  dubious  evidence.    By  distancing  itself  from  the  ILD,  the  NAACP 
alienated the many blacks who saw little reason to repudiate the communists‘ 
assistance, which they saw as ―sincere and wholehearted.‖
39  The editor of one 
black newspaper observed that the NAACP had ―outlived its usefulness if it 
now  feels  that  fighting  the  spread  of  communism  is  more  important  than 
fighting  white  Southerners  who  will  lynch,  massacre,  and  slaughter  and 
expect to get away with it.‖
40  Another black editor accused the NAACP of 
having  an  ―Uncle  Tom  attitude‖  in  this  case.
41  Yet  Walter  White  was 
convinced that it would be ―suicidal‖ for the NAACP ―to be tied up in any 
way with that outfit of lunatics [the communists].‖
42  Most black newspaper 
editors saw the battle between the NAACP and the ILD as ―deplorable‖
43 and 
a ―sad spectacle,‖
44 and one observed that ―we have too few friends to have 
the quarrel as to which we shall lend a helping hand in any given case.‖
45 
After months of repeatedly changing their minds over the choice of legal 
representative, by the end of 1931 all of the defendants had settled on the ILD, 
partly because of the NAACP‘s occasionally condescending attitude toward 
them and their parents.  For example, one NAACP official, William Pickens, 
referred to some of the boys‘ parents as ―the densest and dumbest animals it 
has yet been my privilege to meet‖—a statement that the ILD ensured the 
parents heard about.
46  The communists also sent small monthly checks to the 
 
NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frames 748–49 (noting that this case would have been 
―difficult  enough to handle under normal  circumstances, but the tactics of the Communists have 
inflamed feeling against the boys to fever pitch‖ and observing that the only way to save the boys‘ 
lives was to find a lawyer, ―preferably an Alabamian, whose standing is such as to help mobilize 
effectively  the  considerable  sentiment  which,  we  are  informed,  exists  in  Alabama  among  white 
people of the decent sort, that the boys are innocent‖). 
39. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 69 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
40. Id. at 96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. The Conservative N.A.A.C.P, OKLA. CITY BLACK DISPATCH, May 14, 1931, microformed 
on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 118. 
42. Letter from Walter White to Bob & Herbert, supra note 33, at frame 828. 
43. Editorial,  This  We  Regret,  CAL.  NEWS,  Jan.  7,  1932,  microformed  on  NAACP  Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 469. 
44. An Offensive Defense, CAROLINA TIMES, Jan. 9, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 507. 
45. The Reds at Scottsboro, AFRO–AM. (Balt.), Jan. 9, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 489; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 85–90.   
46. Letter from William Pickens, Field Secretary, NAACP, to Walter White, Secretary, NAACP 
(June 6, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frames 355–57. 388  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
defendants‘ families and treated their parents with kindness and respect.
47 
In a final effort to win back control of the cases, the NAACP persuaded 
Clarence Darrow to participate in the appeals.
48  Not wishing to be perceived 
as rejecting assistance fro m  the  nation‘s  most  eminent  criminal  defense 
lawyer,  the  ILD  professed  eagerness  to  have  Darrow‘s  help.    But  the 
organization insisted that Darrow sever his connections with the NAACP and 
take orders from the ILD.  Confronted with such an ultimatum, Darrow and 
the NAACP withdrew from the case.  One black newspaper predicted that the 
consequence  of  Darrow‘s  withdrawal  ―is  almost  surely  to  be  murder  in 
Scottsboro‖  and  warned  that  the  defendants‘  ―innocent  blood  will  be  a 
crimson stain on the [ILD].‖
49 
Because  communists  generally  viewed  courts  as  simply  ―instruments 
of . . . class oppression,‖ they did not place much faith in litigation.
50  Rather, 
they  favored  ―revolutionary  mass  action  outside  of  courts  and  bourgeois 
legislative bodies.‖
51  Communists believed that the Scottsboro cases could 
educate the masses and increase party membership, especially among blacks.  
Throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  1931,  communists  organized  large 
demonstrations  in  the  North—often  featuring  the  defendants‘  mothers—to 
protest the boys‘ treatment and to petition Governor Benjamin Meeks Miller 
of Alabama and President Herbert Hoover for redress.  In Dresden, Germany, 
communists threw rocks through the windows of the American consulate and 
 
47. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 91.  
48. Letter from Walter White, Secretary,  NAACP, to  Clarence  Darrow,  Attorney (Aug. 31, 
1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 4, frame 259 (stating that he had 
hoped it would have been unnecessary to ask Darrow to enter the Scottsboro case, but that with the 
white lawyers from Birmingham withdrawing, ―we are frankly up against what is probably the most 
delicate  and  difficult  situation  of  our  history‖);  see  also  Letter  from  Walter  White,  Secretary, 
NAACP, to Willie Robinson [sic] (Sept. 11, 1931), microformed on id., frame 268 (expressing great 
pleasure  in  telling  Roberson  that  the  NAACP  had  succeeded  in  retaining  Darrow,  ―the  greatest 
criminal lawyer in the United States if not in the world‖).  
49. Murder in Scottsboro, PHILA. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra 
note  17,  at  pt.  6,  reel  8,  frame  464;  see  also  CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  97–103; 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 37–38. 
50. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  138  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted); see also Appeal to the American Workers for Effective Mass Action to Save the Scottsboro 
Boys, DAILY WORKER (N.Y.), Jan. 20, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, 
reel 8, frame 532 [hereinafter Appeal to the American Workers] (asserting that the ―main function‖ of 
courts ―is to administer law made specifically as a means of persecuting the Negroes‖). 
51. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  138  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted);  see  also  Appeal  to  the  American  Workers,  supra  note  50  (―[T]he  hope  for  the  nine 
Scottsboro victims of American lynch democracy, does not lie in the chambers of the Supreme Court 
of  Alabama.    It  lies  with  the  masses  of  American  workers,  who  in  vigorous  protests  and 
demonstrations will show their determination to end lynch law and to stop Negro persecution. . . .  
Confidence  in  the  courts  cannot  bring  justice.    Only  confidence  in  the  might  and  power  of  the 
organized efforts of the American working class is the method of obtaining the freedom of these 
innocent boys.‖). 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  389 
condemned the ―bloody lynching of our Negro co-workers‖—a scene that was 
repeated  elsewhere in Europe that summer.
52  Even in Tallapoosa County, 
Alabama, communists used the ―Scottsboro lynch verdict‖ to organize black 
sharecroppers into a union demanding higher wages and the release of the 
boys; whites responded with violence and murder.
53 
By the summer of 1931, Governor Miller was receiving thousands of 
abusive letters from around the world.  One typical protest condemned ―the 
brutal slave drivers of Alabama acting through a Ku Klux Klan judge and jury 
inflamed  by  race  hatred . . .  to  send  nine  innocent  children  to  the  electric 
chair.‖
54  ILD attacks on white Alabamians as ―lynchers‖ were reprinted in 
local newspapers, increasing resentment toward the Scottsboro boys.  Local 
whites grew more defensive, insisting that the defendants had been given ―as 
fair  a  trial  as  they  could  have  gotten  in  any  court  in  the  world.‖
55  The 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation, which often supported the appeals of 
southern blacks convicted in  obviously unfair trials, refused to support the 
Scottsboro  defendants  because  of  hostile  public  opinion.    The  governor‘s 
secretary explained that Scottsboro had become ―a white elephant‖ for Miller 
and that the ILD‘s inflammatory statements had ―tied his hands.‖
56  One white 
constituent warned the governor not to let any ―threat or demand from dirty 
yankees or damn communists from the North and throughout the world . . . 
sway you.‖
57  Judge Hawkins confided to defense lawyer Roddy that he did 
not ―really think the boys should be put to death, but . . . the Communists are 
more of an issue than are the FACTS of the case.‖
58  One white Alabamian 
captured the view of many, observing that ―I might have been for acquittin‘ 
them at the first trial, but now after all this stink‘s been raised, we‘ve got to 
 
52. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  142  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted);  see  also  Fight  for  Doomed  Negroes,  N.Y.  TIMES,  July  1,  1931,  at  9  (noting  that 
communists  protesting  Scottsboro  were  responsible  for  recent  mob  attacks  on  the  American 
consulates at Dresden and Leipzig, Germany);  Communist Uprising Is Police Idea, BIRMINGHAM 
AGE-HERALD, June 18, 1931, at 1 (noting that youth in Dresden threw bottles through the windows 
of the American consulate containing messages stating, ―Down with the bloody lynch law on our 
Negro comrades‖). 
53. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 121–30, 138–46, 167; Labor Defense Charges 
―Murder,‖ N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1931, at 30; Volleys Disperse Alabama Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 1931, at 30.  
54. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  145  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted). 
55. Id. at 112 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. Letter  from  William  Pickens,  Field  Secretary,  NAACP,  to  Walter  White,  Secretary, 
NAACP (June 1, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 252.  
57. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 136 n.90 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
58. Id. at 119 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 390  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
hang ‘em.‖
59 
C.  Alabama Supreme Court 
It was in this climate that the Scottsboro verdicts were appealed to the 
Alabama Supreme Court.  In recent decades, state supreme courts in the South 
had  become  somewhat  more  protective  of  the  procedural  rights  of  black 
criminal defendants, frequently reversing convictions, even in cases of murder 
or rape, on grounds such as prejudicial racial statements by prosecutors, the 
refusal of trial judges to change venue or grant defense counsel adequate time 
to prepare, and the use of coerced confessions.
60  To be sure, criminal justice 
for southern blacks remained grossly unequal: Blacks still could not serve on 
southern juries; black lawyers could not command fair hearings in  southern 
courtrooms;  black  witnesses  w ere  treated  as  less  credible  than  white 
witnesses; and the death penalty was never imposed on white rapists or on 
men who raped black women.  Still, some progress had been made.  Yet in 
explosive cases that generated outside criticism of the South or that  were 
otherwise perceived to threaten white supremacy, southern courts regressed in 
their treatment of black defendants.
61 
Alabama whites were especially incensed by criticism over Scottsboro 
because they felt that they deserved praise for avoiding a lynchin g.  The 
Scottsboro Progressive Age complimented local citizens for ―their patience 
and  chivalry‖
62  after  the  alleged  rapes,  and  the  Chattanooga  Daily  Times 
praised them for setting ―the rest of the South an impressive example in self-
restraint.‖
63  A Georgia newspaper warned that appealing the convictions of 
black men for raping white women was ―playing with fire‖; a hasty trial was 
preferable to a lynching and indeed was ―a first step, and a very important 
one.‖
64  Many southern newspapers predicted a resurgence  in  lynchings  if 
outsiders persisted in criticizing trials such as those at Scottsboro.
65 
 
59. Id. at 136 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
60. E.g., Tannehill v. State, 48 So. 662, 662 (Ala. 1909); Williams v. State, 146 So. 422, 424 
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1914); State v. Jones, 53 So. 959, 961 (La. 1911); Byrd v. State, 123 So. 867, 870–71 (Miss. 1929); 
Story v. State, 97 So. 806, 807 (Miss. 1923); Sykes v. State, 42 So. 875, 875 (Miss. 1907); MANGUM, 
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supra note 9, at 197–223. 
61. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
62. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  105  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted). 
63. Id. at 106 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. Emanuel,  Lynching  and  the  Law  in  Georgia,  supra  note  14,  at  246–47  n.161  (quoting 
Editorial, Playing with Fire, FORUM (Washington, Ga.), June 25, 1931) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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unidentified newspaper, May 22, 1931, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  391 
When the Scottsboro appeal reached the state supreme court, its justices 
were said to be seething  with anger at the protests  and threats directed at 
them.
66  The Communist Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, had called the 
court  an  ―instrument  of  the  Wall  Street  Imperialists,‖  which  would  surely 
affirm  the  boys‘  convictions.
67  Chief  Justice  John  C.  Anderson  publicly 
criticized such statements, which he said had been made with ―the evident 
intent to bulldoze this court,‖
68 and he insisted that the justices ―will not be 
intimidated.‖
69 
In  their  appeals,  the  ILD  lawyers  briefly  raised  the  issues  of  race 
discrimination in jury selection and the inadequacy of defense counsel,  but 
they  emphasized  the  unfairness  of  the  trials  and  especially  the  mob‘s 
influence  on the  juries.  In reply, the state attorney  general denied that ―a 
curious mob‖ had influenced the outcome of the trials.
70  The headline in the 
Montgomery  Advertiser‘s  report  of  the  oral  argument  observed,  ―Negro 
Partisans ‗Dictate‘ Course to High Court.‖
71 
The  Alabama  Supreme  Court  had  previously  reversed  convictions  in 
similar cases of mob domination.
72  Other southern courts in less publicized 
cases had reversed conviction s when defense counsel had been appointed 
even a couple of days before trial.
73  Yet on March 24, 1932, the Alabama 
Supreme Court voted  6–1  to  uphold  the  death  sentences  of  four  of  the 
defendants.  The court granted a new trial to Eugene Williams because he had 
been a juvenile—thirteen years old—at the time of conviction.
74  The court 
emphasized  that  the  speed  of  the  trials  was  ―highly  desirable‖  because  it 
instilled  greater  respect  for  the  law  and  that  the  presence  of  national 
guardsmen  surrounding  the  courthouse  gave  ―notice  to  everybody  that  the 
strong arm of the state was there to assure the accused a lawful trial.‖
75  The 
 
8, frame 134 (probably appearing in the MONTGOMERY ADV. and applauding the citizens of Jackson 
County for deporting themselves ―with dignity and self-restraint‖ and noting that prompt action like 
that taken by the court in the Scottsboro cases is what critics of mob violence had always urged as a 
substitute for lynchings). 
66. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 156.  
67. Id. at 156 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
68. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, 
supra note 6, at 49. 
69. Defers New Action in Scottsboro Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 13. 
70. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 157. 
71. Id. at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676, 676 (Ala. 1898). 
73. E.g.,  McDaniel  v.  Commonwealth,  205  S.W.  915,  918  (Ky.  1918);  Stroud  v. 
Commonwealth, 169 S.W. 1021, 1022–23 (Ky. 1914); State  v. Collins, 29 So. 180, 181–82 (La. 
1900) (discussing numerous additional Louisiana cases).  
74. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 213–14 (Ala. 1932), rev’d, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
75. Powell, 141 So. at 211, 213; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 158 (internal 
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court also ruled sufficient the appointment of counsel on the morning of trial.  
In a letter to the NAACP‘s Walter White, Chief Justice Anderson, the sole 
dissenter,  explained  that  the  communists  had  ―been  very  imprudent  and 
injected a lot of irrelevant bunk into the controversy and instead of helping it 
possibly injured these defendants.‖
76  Anderson, who had much preferred that 
―these defendants be tried under different circumstances,‖ regretted that his 
colleagues  had  not  been  ―above  permitting  outside  influence  to  prejudice 
these  defendants.‖
77  As  a  reward  for  his  efforts,  Anderson  received  a 
telegram from an ILD branch assailing him as a ―traitor to the masses‖ for his 
willingness to abide by the majority‘s decision.
78 
The Montgomery Advertiser opined that the court‘s ruling ―should satisfy 
all reasonable persons‖ that the Scottsboro boys had received fair trials.
79  Yet 
several other Alabama newspapers regretted that the court had not granted a 
new trial to allay doubts regarding the defendants‘ guilt.  The Birmingham 
Age-Herald observed, ―[t]he fact remains that there was an element of mob 
feeling in the air,‖
80 and the Birmingham News insisted there was ―ground for 
divergence  of  opinions  concerning  these  cases.‖
81  Moderate  whites  in 
Alabama blamed the ruling on communist efforts at intimidation, which they 
suspected the state jurists had ―leaned unconsciously backwards‖ to resist.
82  
A black newspaper similarly concluded, ―it is possible that the highest legal 
tribunal in Alabama affirmed these death sentences because it did no[t] want 
to  appear  as  being  swayed,  cowed  or  bluffed  by  a  group  of  radicals.‖
83  
Communists thought the ruling revealed the ―highest courts working hand in 
glove with owners of America against [the] working class.‖
84 
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The Daily Worker predicted that review by the U.S. Supreme Court—just 
another ―capitalist court‖
85—would be a ―mere gesture aimed at facilitating 
the  legal  lynching  of  these  children.‖
86  A  black  newspaper  in  the  North 
professed greater faith in the high court, reasoning that ―America, grasping for 
the moral leadership of the world, cannot afford to set the example of staging 
a legal lynching.‖
87  The liberal Nation agreed that the boys‘ prospects were 
―very bright‖ because ―the conscience of the world  [would] be profoundly 
shocked‖ if the Court affirmed their convictions and thus ―encourag[ed] legal 
lynching in the South.‖
88 
D.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
In  1932  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  was  hardly  the  champion  of  racial 
equality that it would one day become in popular mythology.  Around 1900, 
the  Court  had  sustained  the  constitutionality  of  laws  mandating  racial 
segregation
89  and disfranchising blacks,
90  leading the fledging NAACP to 
conclude in 1915 that the Court ―has virtually declared that the colored man 
has no civil rights.‖
91  To be sure, the Court in the second  decade  of  the 
twentieth  century  struck  down  residential  segregation  ordinances,
92  certain 
laws that promoted peonage (compulsory labor to discharge debts),
93 and the 
grandfather  clause  (a  device  insulating  illiterate  whites  from  the 
disfranchising effect of literacy tests).
94  But in 1927 the Court strongly 
implied  that  state -mandated  racial  segregation  in  public   schools  was 
constitutionally permissible,
95  and in 1935 the Court would unanimously 
sustain the exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party primaries —the only 
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elections that mattered in the one-party South.
96  In 1932, virtually nobody 
thought of the Court as a heroic defender of the rights of racial minorities.
97 
Nor had the Court yet taken substantial strides toward protecting the 
procedural rights of criminal defendants in state courts.  Prior to  Moore v. 
Dempsey
98  in  1923,  the  Court  had  reversed  state  criminal  convictions  on 
federal  constitutional  grounds  in  only  a  handful  of  cases  involving  race 
discrimination in jury selection.
99  In other cases, the Court had denied that the 
Fourteenth Amendment converted the procedural protections of the federal 
Bill of Rights into safeguards against  state governments and had  narrowly 
construed the Due Process Clause of that Amendment, which does explicitly 
constrain the states.
100 
Moore was the progenitor of modern American criminal procedure.  The 
case arose from an infamous racial massacre in Phillips County, Arkansas, in 
1919.  Black tenant farmers and sharecroppers had tried to organize a union 
and hire white lawyers to sue planters for peonage practices.  Local whites 
cracked down with a vengeance.  When whites shot into a church where black 
unionists were meeting, blacks returned the gunfire.  A white man was killed, 
and mayhem quickly ensued.  Marauding whites, supported by federal troops 
ostensibly dispatched to quell the disturbance, went on a rampage, tracking 
down blacks throughout the countryside and killing dozens of them.  Seventy-
nine blacks, and no whites, were prosecuted and convicted for their actions 
during this ―race riot,‖ and twelve received the death penalty.  The trials of 
those  twelve  lasted  only  an  hour  or  two  each,  and  the  juries,  from  which 
blacks had been systematically excluded, deliberated for only a few minutes.  
Huge  mobs  of  angry  whites  surrounded  the  courthouse,  menacing  the 
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defendants and the jurors and threatening a lynching.  Five of the defendants 
appealed  their  death  sentences  to  the  Supreme  Court,  arguing  that  mob-
dominated  trials  violate  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.    By  a  vote  of  6–2,  the  Supreme  Court  agreed,  reversed  the 
convictions,  and  ordered  a  federal  district  judge  to  conduct  a  hearing  on 
whether the defendants‘ trials had been influenced by the mob.
101 
Moore  offered  some  hope  that  the  Scottsboro  defendants  might  find 
justice in the Supreme Court.  Their lawyers raised three constitutional claims 
in their appeal: mob domination of the trials in violation of the Due Process 
Clause;  intentional  exclusion  of  blacks  from  the  grand  and  petit  juries  in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and denial of the right to counsel in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.
102  On the day of the oral argument, extra 
police officers patrolled the Supreme Court building and grounds; the plaza 
facing the Capitol was cleared; and elaborate preparations were made to 
preempt  the  mass  communist  demonstrations  that  had  been  promised.
103  
Mary Mooney, mother of the imprisoned California labor leader Tom Mooney 
(who had been wrongfully convicted for the Preparedness Day bombing in 
San Francisco in 1916), attended the Court session, noting her interest in 
seeing  that  other  mothers‘  sons  received  justice.
104  Several  of  Alabama‘s 
congressmen also attended the argument, as did an unusually large number of 
blacks.
105 
A few weeks later, the Court reversed the defendants‘ convictions on the 
ground that the right to counsel had been denied, declining to reach the other 
two  issues.
106  Perhaps the  justices chose the basis for decision that they 
deemed least controversial.  For the Court to have reversed the Scottsboro 
convictions on the basis of  Moore might have required basic changes in Jim 
Crow justice: The Scottsboro trials were not quite so farcical as those of the 
Phillips County defendants.  The Scottsboro boys received a genuine defense; 
their trials lasted for several hours (not forty-five minutes); the juries trying 
them deliberated more than the five minutes in Moore; their cases did not 
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raise the broader implications of the Phillips County race riot; and they had 
not been tortured into confessing.
107  Similarly, to invalidate their convictions 
because of race discrimination in jury selection would ha ve been far more 
provocative to white southerners because preserving white supremacy in the 
courtroom required excluding blacks from juries.
108  By contrast, overturning 
the convictions because the defendants had been denied the right to counsel 
was unlikely  to affect the outcome of any retrials or Jim Crow justice in 
general.
109 
Prior to  1932, the Court had never ruled that due process requires the 
states to provide counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases, but neither 
had it rejected that position.  Ev ery state court confronting that issue had 
required the government to appoint counsel in such circumstances.
110  To be 
sure, Ozie Powell, whose appeal was the focus of the Supreme Court‘s first 
intervention in Scottsboro, had received a court-appointed lawyer.  He made 
two  arguments  as  to  why  this  appointment  failed  to  satisfy  federal 
constitutional  standards.
111  First, the state had not afforded him adequate 
opportunity to hire counsel of his own choice.  Second, the court appointment 
was inadequate because it had been made the morning of the trial, and thus 
defense  counsel  was  denied  an  adequate  opportunity  to  consult  clients, 
interview witnesses, and prepare a defense. 
The Alabama court had deemed this last -minute appointment of counsel 
sufficient to satisfy the state constitutional requirement of a court -appointed 
lawyer in capital cases.  In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has no authority 
to review state court interpretations of state law.  Thus, for the Court to 
reverse Powell‘s conviction, it would have had to construe the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require the assistance of counsel in 
capital  cases.    American  constitutional  history  reveals  that the  justices  are 
least reluctant to expand constitutional rights when doing so involves holding 
a few renegade states to the norm already espoused by the vast majority.
112  
As of 1932, not a single state had rejected the right of indigent defendants in 
capital cases to state-appointed counsel.  Indeed, one reason that state courts 
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had  not  yet considered  whether the  Due Process Clause  of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guaranteed such a right is that all of them confronting the issue 
had interpreted their own state constitutions to do so. 
Once the justices determined that due process required the appointment of 
counsel  for  indigent  capital  defendants,  reversing  Powell‘s  conviction  was 
easy.  First, Powell had been denied the opportunity to hire a lawyer of his 
own  choice.    Second,  to  most  disinterested  observers,  the  trial  judge‘s 
appointment  of  counsel  had  been  obviously  inadequate.    At  the  trials, 
although defense counsel did cross-examine prosecution witnesses, they made 
only a feeble effort to change the trial venue, presented neither opening nor 
closing  arguments,  and  called  none  of  their  own  witnesses  other  than  the 
defendants, some of whom implicated each other in a desperate effort to avoid 
the death penalty.
113  The Scottsboro trials may not have been quite the sham 
affair under review  in  Moore,  yet  most  lawyers  would  have  considered 
obviously inadequate the representation afforded to the defendants. 
Moreover, the trial record revealed a high probability that the defendants 
were  innocent—a  circumstance  likely  to  be  significant  to  Supreme  Court 
justices reviewing their convictions, even if technically irrelevant to the merits 
of their appeal.  Because criminal procedure safeguards often shield the guilty 
from punishment, they are usually controversial, and the justices are probably 
more inclined to identify new rights in cases where defendants have a strong 
claim of innocence.  As we have seen, the medical evidence introduced at the 
Scottsboro trials raised serious doubts as to whether any rape had occurred, and 
the accusers had provided inconsistent testimony.
114  Moreover, the women 
possessed  a  clear  mo tive  for  fabrication:  avoiding  a  possible  Mann  Act 
prosecution for traveling across state lines for immoral purposes (prostitution). 
Many newspapers, even in parts of the South, applauded the high court‘s 
decision in Powell.  The Richmond Times-Dispatch went so far as to say that 
the  ruling  ―will  be  welcomed  throughout  the  country,  with  the  possible 
exception of Alabama.‖
115  The New York Times likewise hailed the ruling, 
which it said ―ought to abate the rancor of extreme radicals, while confirming 
the faith of the American people in the soundness of their institutions and 
especially in the integrity of their courts.‖
116  Professor Felix Frankfurter of 
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the Harvard Law School called the decision ―a notable chapter in the history 
of  liberty‖  and  observed  that  the  same  Court  that  had  recently  served  the 
interests  of  property  owners  was  now  protecting  ―illiterate‖  and  ―vagrant‖ 
blacks from oppression.
117  A black newspaper proclaimed the ruling ―a great 
stroke in the name of justice,‖
118 and the NAACP saw it as a ―vindicat[ion]‖ 
of  its  view  that  victories  for  racial  justice  ―are  best  won  by  strictly  legal 
means.‖
119  By contrast, the Daily Worker condemned Powell for instructing 
Alabama  authorities  on  ―how  ‗properly‘  to  carry  through  such  lynch 
schemes.‖
120  The liberal lawyer Morris Ernst likewise assailed the decision as 
―empty  and  meaningless‖  and  ―cunningly  uncourageous‖  because  it 
disregarded the issues of ―deep social significance‖ and left the defendants in 
―horrid shape‖ for a retrial, which was likely to feature a half-hearted lawyer 
―who will saunter . . . before a white jury while mobs outside sing anthems 
and shout for hangings.‖
121 
E.  On Remand 
The Supreme Court‘s ruling seemed only to make Alabama whites more 
defensive.    After  the  initial  trials,  some  of  them  had  doubted  whether  the 
defendants had been treated fairly.  However, after what the Birmingham Post 
called the high court‘s ―stinging rebuke‖ of the state supreme court, anyone 
publicly expressing doubts about the defendants‘ guilt or the fairness of their 
trials  was  courting  physical  danger.
122  White  Alabamians  also  greatly 
resented  northern newspaper accounts that portrayed them as barefooted, 
tobacco-chewing illiterates.  Judge Hawkins opined with regard to the retrials 
that ―[t]he presence of troops will be more imperative now than ever.‖
123 
The  ILD  asked  Samuel  Leibowitz,  a  New  York  Jew  and  one  of  the 
nation‘s leading criminal defense lawyers, to represent the defendants at their 
new trials.  Leibowitz agreed to serve without fee in exchange for a promise 
of independence in orchestrating the defense and a commitment from the ILD 
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to lower its public profile regarding Scottsboro.  Upon arriving in Alabama, 
Leibowitz sought to distance the case from the communist issue and professed 
no intention to tell Alabamians how to run their affairs.
124 
As the retrials began, Leibowitz moved for a change of venue, which was 
granted, to Decatur, Alabama, fifty miles west of Scottsboro.  Yet nearly all 
whites in Decatur were already convinced of the defendants‘ guilt.  A large 
crowd  attended  the  first  of  the  retrials,  though  the  threat  of  violence  that 
pervaded  the  original  proceedings  was  initially  absent.    The  Scottsboro 
episode had attracted so much national attention by then that representatives 
of several New York newspapers and the wire services were in attendance.
125 
As the retrial proceedings began, Leibowitz moved to quash the original 
indictments on the ground that no blacks had served on grand juries in 
Jackson County since Reconstruction, even though they were nearly  10% of 
the  county‘s  population.    Summoned  to  testify,  the  county‘s  jury 
commissioners  denied  that  blacks  were  excluded  because  of  their  race.  
Leibowitz  also  called  as  witnesses  several  blacks  from  Jackson  County  to 
demonstrate  that  they  satisfied  the  statutory  jury-selection  standard  of 
―integrity, good character and sound judgment.‖
126  The prosecutor tried to 
humiliate and intimidate these black witnesses, but they held up well under 
cross-examination, and Leibowitz established that they were as well qualified 
as many whites to serve as jurors.  Nevertheless, Judge James Edwin Horton 
overruled the motion to quash the indictments.
127 
Leibowitz then challenged the jury-selection system in Morgan County, 
site of the new trials.  He called as witnesses ten prominent  blacks from the 
county to demonstrate their qualifications to serve as jurors.  These educated 
and refined blacks, most of whom held college degrees, made impressive 
witnesses.
128 
Leibowitz‘s trial tactics provoked outrage among the local white citizenry.  
When he demanded that the prosecutor refer to black witnesses with courtesy 
titles, courtroom spectators were merely puzzled, but when he questioned the 
honesty of county jury commissioners, they grew visibly angry.  A crowd of 
200 young men gathered in town to ―protest against the manner in which Mr. 
Leibowitz  has  examined  the  State‘s  witnesses.‖
129  After  Judge  Horton 
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rejected the defense‘s challenge to jury selection, he admonished courtroom 
spectators about the death threats being made against Leibowitz on Decatur 
streets and warned that he would order the national guardsmen to shoot to kill 
if any effort was made to harm the defendants.
130 
The prosecution‘s strategy at Patterson‘s retrial was to have Victoria Price 
testify  as  graphically  as  possible  about  the  rapes.    Leibowitz‘s  cross-
examination was brutal, as he tried to demonstrate that Price was a prostitute 
and  that  her  account  of  what  happened  on  the  train  was  riddled  with 
contradictions.  Price proved a feisty witness who yielded no ground, although 
Leibowitz was able to elicit from her some contradictory statements.  Any 
damage he did to Price‘s credibility, however, came at the cost of alienating 
courtroom  whites,  who  were  outraged  at  this  attack  on  the  chastity  and 
honesty of a southern  white  woman.  One spectator whispered to another, 
―It‘ll be a wonder if ever he leaves town alive,‖ and angry local residents 
again gathered in town, this time to protest the manner in which Leibowitz 
had  cross-examined  Price.
131  Once  again,  Judge  Horton  responded  by 
strongly  defending  the  rule  of  law,  denouncing  the  ―mob  spirit,‖
132  and 
insisting that he would defend the lives of the defendants and anyone else 
involved in the case.
133 
One of the examining physicians, Dr. R.R. Bridges, testified that all of the 
sperm found  in  Price‘s  vagina  was  non-motile,  which  should  have  been 
conclusive exculpatory evidence, given that the alleged rapes had occurred 
only  ninety  minutes  before  the  medical  examination.    A  second  doctor, 
Marvin Lynch, privately confessed to Judge Horton that he had never believed 
that  the  young  women  had  been  raped.    But  Lynch  rejected  Horton‘s 
exhortations to state this  view publicly,  explaining that ―[i]f I testified for 
those  boys  I‘d  never  be  able  to  go  back  into  Jackson  County.‖
134  The 
defendant‘s medical expert, Dr. Edward A. Reisman, testified that a woman 
raped by six men, as alleged, could not possibly have in her vagina only the 
small traces of semen found in the medical examination of Price.  Reisman 
also declared that women who had just been repeatedly raped could not have 
appeared  as  calm  and  collected  as  Price  and  Bates  had  been.    One  local 
resident  was  unimpressed  by  this  testimony:  ―When  a  nigger  has  expert 
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witnesses, we have a right to ask who is paying for them.‖
135 
The star witness for the defense was Ruby Bates, who made a dramatic 
entrance  and  retracted  her  earlier  allegations  of  rape.    However,  her 
credibility, necessarily compromised by her contrary testimony in the original 
trials, was further  impeached by the prosecution‘s suggestion that she  had 
been paid to testify—an allegation that apparently convinced most locals.  In 
closing  arguments,  one  prosecutor  referred  to  the  ―fancy  New  York 
clothes‖
136  worn  by  Bates  and,  pointing  at  the  Jewish  defense  attorneys 
(Leibowitz and Joseph Brodsky of the ILD), appealed to the jury to prove that 
Alabama justice could not be bought ―with Jew money from New York.‖
137  
Another prosecutor told the jury, ―If you acquit this Negro, put a garland of 
roses around his neck, give him a supper and send him to New York City‖ 
where Dr. Harry Fosdick (the liberal Protestant minister who had provided 
support for Bates) would ―dress him up in a high hat and morning coat, gray-
striped trousers and spats.‖
138 
Even if this had been a run-of-the-mill, black-on-white rape case, it would 
have been difficult for a jury of southern whites to have acquitted Patterson.  
But  Scottsboro  was  no  ordinary  case.    With  communists  attacking  white 
Alabamians  as  lynchers,  and  Leibowitz  assailing  southern  white  jury 
commissioners as liars, an acquittal was out of the question.  The trial had 
ceased to be about determining Patterson‘s guilt or innocence and had become 
instead a challenge to southern white supremacy.  With the issue framed this 
way, the  jury took just five  minutes to convict (though  one  juror held out 
against the  death penalty for  hours before finally  capitulating).  Leibowitz 
called the result ―a triumph of bigotry,‖ and the Chicago Defender, one of the 
leading black newspapers in the country, denounced the trial ―as a mockery, a 
pretension of justice and a crime against our national honor.‖
139  New York 
newspapers  professed  ―shock‖  at  the  verdict,
140  while  some  southern 
newspapers  blamed  any  unfairness  on  outside  agitation,  which  Alabama 
whites naturally resented.
141 
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The day Patterson was convicted, 20,000 blacks in New York City signed 
a petition promising to join a protest march in Washington, D.C., later that 
spring.  Huge crowds gathered in New York to hear Ruby Bates proclaim 
herself a victim of the oppression of the Scottsboro ruling class and to hear 
Leibowitz denigrate Alabama whites as ―bigots whose mouths are slits in their 
faces,  whose  eyes  pop  out  like  a  frog‘s,  whose  chins  drip  tobacco  juice, 
bewhiskered  and  filthy.‖
142  The  New  York  press  faithfully  reported  such 
comments, which were then widely reprinted in Alabama newspapers, making 
Leibowitz  even  more anathema to southern  whites.   One  Alabama journal 
retorted, ―The New York Jew says there is no such thing as a fair trial in 
Alabama. . . .  It seems to this paper . . . [that] this recent recruit from Russia 
is a poor sort of chap to try to blight the good name of Alabama.‖
143 
After pronouncing sentence on Patterson, Judge Horton delayed the other 
retrials because Leibowitz‘s statements to the press were a ―millstone around 
the necks of the defendants.‖
144  Meanwhile, for the first time, some southern 
newspapers outside of Alabama declared the boys innocent.  Douglas Southall 
Freeman, editor of the Richmond News Leader, observed that ―[t]he men are 
being sentenced to death primarily because they are black‖ and because of the 
―‗unwritten law‘ that when a white woman accuses . . . a Negro he must prove 
his  innocence.‖
145  Josephus  Daniels,  editor  of  the  Raleigh  News  and 
Observer,  called  the  verdict  ―shocking‖
146  and  ―outrageous.‖
147  The 
Chattanooga  News  declared  that  one  could  not  ―conceive  of  a  civilized 
community taking human lives on the strength of this miserable affair.‖
148  By 
contrast, newspapers in the Deep South tended to defend the fairness of the 
trials.
149 
In Alabama, the few whites who   continued to raise doubts about the 
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fairness of the defendants‘ treatment were forcefully suppressed.  A sociology 
professor  at  Birmingham-Southern  College  who  was  sympathetic  to  the 
defendants  was  denied  an  extension  of  his  contract.    Rabbi  Benjamin 
Goldstein,  another  supporter,  was  forced  to  resign  from  his  temple  in 
Montgomery  and  then  to  leave  the  state;  his  congregants  worried  that  the 
rabbi‘s  controversial  stand  on  Scottsboro  would  unleash  a  wave  of  anti-
Semitism.  One observer noted that many whites conceded the defendants‘ 
probable innocence but nonetheless insisted, ―If we let Negroes get by with 
this case, no white woman will be safe in the South.‖
150  Many moderates 
apparently  hoped  that  the  governor  would  commute  the  sentences  to  life 
imprisonment, apparently deeming this an acceptable compromise for black 
men falsely accused of raping white women.
151 
In June 1933, Judge Horton, whom Leibowitz had called ―one of the finest 
jurists  I  have  ever  met,‖
152  granted  the  defense  motion  for  a  new  trial, 
explaining that he found the evidence against Patterson unconvincing.  Horton 
secretly  hoped  that  his  action  would  forestall  further  prosecutions  of  the 
defendants.
153 
The  Birmingham  Post  applauded  Horton‘s  decision  and  declared  the 
defendants probably innocent, but it was the only newspaper in the state to do 
so.
154  Some prominent whites in Alabama, including the president of the state 
bar association, also endorsed Horton‘s ruling, but the predominant reaction in 
the  state  was  hostile.    Tom  Heflin,  a  former  U.S. Senator  from  Alabama, 
declared that Horton‘s ruling was ―putting wicked thoughts in the minds of 
lawless negro men and greatly increasing the danger to the white women of 
Alabama.‖
155  The state attorney general who had helped prosecute the case, 
Thomas E. Knight, Jr., sought to have the judge—whom one critic derided as 
having  ―no  more  backbone  than  in  an  angle  worm‖—removed  from  the 
case.
156  The following year, Horton, who had faced no opposition when he 
stood for election six years earlier, was defeated for re election.  By contrast, 
Knight was elected lieutenant governor.
157 
The Scottsboro retrials resumed in November 1933.  Recent developments 
raised  doubts  as  to  whether  the  defendants  and  their  lawyers  could  be 
protected from mob violence.  That summer in Tuscaloosa, three ILD lawyers 
defending blacks charged with raping and killing a white woman had been 
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turned over by deputy sheriffs to a firing squad, and two of them were killed.  
In September, an elderly black  man accused  of raping a mentally retarded 
white woman—even the police found the allegation incredible—was lynched.  
The local newspaper blamed the ILD for spreading  communist propaganda 
among  ―our  contented  Negro  population,‖
158  while  the  Montgomery 
Advertiser attributed the lynchings to ―hotheads who . . . fear[ed] that outside 
interference  would  block  the  course  of  justice.‖
159  Yet,  with  Birmingham 
newspapers noting an ―extremely grave‖ probability of a massacre,
160 Judge 
W.W. Callahan, the new trial judge, declined to request militia protection for 
the  trials,  and  the  governor  sent  none.    Callahan  also  denied  the  defense 
motion for another change of venue, despite sworn statements in affidavits 
submitted by ILD investigators that a national guardsman had conceded he 
and his colleagues would offer only token resistance to a lynching attempt and 
that local whites had admitted they would conceal their belief that the boys 
should be executed in order to get on the jury.
161 
Before the new trials had begun, the jury commissioners in Jackson 
County, where the defenda nts had been originally indicted, had altered the 
jury lists by adding the names of several blacks.  A defense handwriting 
expert testified that the names of most or perhaps all of the blacks had been 
fraudulently added after the lists had been initially c ompiled.  Despite this 
uncontradicted testimony, Judge Callahan invoked the presumption that jury 
commissioners had acted lawfully and rejected the defense motion to quash 
the indictments.
162 
At  Patterson‘s  retrial,  Judge  Callahan  refused  to  permit  Leibowitz  to 
question Victoria Price about whether she had had sexual intercourse the night 
before the train trip, and  he nearly ruled Leibowitz  in contempt  when the 
lawyer persisted in trying to get such evidence before the jury.
163  Callahan 
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repeatedly rescued Price when she became bogged down in contradictions, 
and  he  denied  Leibowitz  the  opportunity  to  undermine  the  credibility  of 
prosecution  witnesses.    Intimidated  by  death  threats  and  recovering  from 
surgery in a New York hospital, Ruby Bates refused to return to Alabama to 
testify.  The prosecution used against Patterson his earlier admission that he 
had seen some of the black youths raping the women.  Yet the prosecutor‘s 
most effective point may have been the question he posed to jurors in his 
closing argument: Did they really wish to believe the defendant‘s account, 
which essentially charged their neighbors in Scottsboro with doing ―a lot of 
awful things over there‖?
164 
Callahan instructed the jury that ―there is a very strong presumption under 
the  law  that  [a  white  woman  charging  rape]  would  not  and  did  not  yield 
voluntarily to intercourse with . . . a Negro‖ and that this was true ―whether 
she be the most despised, ignorant and abandoned woman of the community, 
or  the  spotless  virgin  and  daughter  of  a  prominent  home  of  luxury  and 
learning.‖
165  The judge glowered at Leibowitz while instructing the jury to 
ignore  any  of  defense  counsel‘s  intimations  regarding  Price‘s  prior  sexual 
history,  then  forgot—until  Leibowitz  reminded  him—to  give  the  jury  the 
instruction form for rendering a verdict of acquittal.  The jurors would have 
been unlikely to miss the significance of this oversight.
166  The jury convicted 
Patterson and sentenced him to death, and then a second jury did the same in 
the retrial of Clarence Norris.  Leib owitz left the courtroom under heavy 
guard because of death threats.
167 
On appeal, both defendants challenged their convictions on the ground of 
race discrimination in jury selection.  Supreme Court precedents from around 
1900 made it very difficult to prove  such discrimination.
168  The Alabama 
Supreme Court rejected Norris‘s claim  on the basis  of these precedents.
169  
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The  court  refused  to  presume  discrimination  by  the  jury  commissioners, 
denied  any  affirmative  duty  to  place  blacks  on  juries, and  deferred  to  the 
commissioners‘ denials of race discrimination.  With regard to the appellant‘s 
claim  that  Callahan‘s  administration  of  the  trial  was  reversible  error,  the 
Alabama jurists found only that ―on one or two occasions [he had] manifested 
slight impatience.‖
170  The court did not even reach the merits of Patterson‘s 
appeal  because  of  an  arguable  failure  to  comply  with  Alabama‘s  rules  of 
appellate procedure.  The flaw was highly technical: Patterson‘s claim was 
untimely only if the ninety-day period in which to file a bill of exceptions 
commenced at the date of judgment rather than the date of sentencing and if 
his  new-trial  motion,  which  would  have  tolled  the  ninety-day  period,  was 
nugatory because filed after expiration of the trial court‘s term.  (And even 
then, the bill of exceptions had been filed late only because of a plane crash.)  
Technical  though  it  was,  this  procedural  snafu  placed  Patterson‘s  life  in 
jeopardy.  The Alabama Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of his 
jury-discrimination claim,
171 which apparently meant that the U.S. Supreme 
Court  could  not  do  so  either,  even  though  Patterson‘s  appeal  rested  on 
precisely the same ground as Norris‘s.
172 
F.  The U.S. Supreme Court—Again 
Late in 1934, two ILD attorneys were caught trying to bribe Victoria Price 
to  change  her  story.    An  infuriated  Leibowitz  declared  that  the  ILD  had 
―assassinated  the  Scottsboro  boys  with  that  sort  of  business,‖  and  he 
threatened to terminate his involvement with the case unless the communists 
withdrew.
173  The Daily Worker responded by accusing Leibowitz of joining 
forces with the ―Alabama lynch rulers,‖ and the ILD tried to fire him on the 
pretense that he was inexperienced in constitutional appeals.
174  But Leibowitz 
convinced Patterson, Norris, and their parents to stick with him.  As in 1931, 
however, a subsequent visit from ILD lawyers promptly convinced the boys 
and their families to change their minds.  Another unseemly battle for control 
of the case ensued—this time between Leibowitz and the ILD.  Only after the 
defendants had switched back and forth numerous times was a compromise 
finally reached: Leibowitz represented Norris in the  Supreme Court, while 
other lawyers hired by the ILD represented Patterson.
175 
 
170. Id. at 564. 
171. Patterson v. State, 156 So. 567, 568–69 (Ala. 1934). 
172. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 303–08; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, 
supra note 6, at 238; KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
173. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  311  (citation  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted). 
174. Id. at 312 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
175. Id. at 308–19; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 238–41; Held as 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  407 
Norris‘s appeal focused on race discrimination in jury selection.  Alabama 
responded by invoking Thomas v. Texas,
176 which held that the U.S. Supreme 
Court must defer to state court findings of  fact on that issue.  During 
Leibowitz‘s argument, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes interrupted to ask 
if the lawyer could prove his allegation that the names of blacks had been 
forged on the jury rolls.  Leibowitz said that he could, and in a moment of 
high drama, the justices examined the jury rolls of Jackson County through 
magnifying  glasses—apparently  the  first  time  they  had  ever  engaged  in 
independent evidence-gathering in appellate proceedings.
177 
Six weeks later, the justices overturned Norris‘s conviction—the first time 
in decades the Court had done so on the ground of race discrimination in jury 
selection.  To be sure, Norris created no new substantive constitutional law: 
Since  Strauder  v.  West  Virginia
178  in  1880,  the  Court  had  consistently 
construed  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  to  bar  race  discrimination  in  jury 
selection.  However, Norris did alter the critical rules governing how such 
claims were to be proved; for over a generation, these rules had doomed to 
failure  virtually all such claims.  The  justices  now reinvigorated the  long-
dormant dicta of Neal v. Delaware,
179 which approved inferring intentional 
discrimination from the lengthy absence of blacks from jury service.
180  If, 
under such circumstances, the state was not obliged to go beyond simply 
denying the existence of race discrimination, then the constitutional safeguard 
―would be but a vain and illusory requirement.‖
181  Further, Norris held, when 
an alleged federal constitutional violation turned on disputed facts, the federal 
courts must find those facts for themselves, not simply defer to state court 
findings.
182 
For  two  reasons,  Norris  was  an  appealing  case  for  the  justices  to 
reconsider the rules governing proof of race discrimination in jury selection.  
First,  not  only  had  blacks  been  absent  for  decades  from  juries  in  these 
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Alabama counties, but local court officers had been caught in an embarrassing 
lie, the only plausible explanation for which was their desire to cover up the 
intentional exclusion of blacks from juries.  Second, by 1935, the innocence 
of the Scottsboro boys, in the words of one northern journal, had ―long been 
established before the bar of public opinion.‖
183  Most Americans apparently 
found Ruby Bates‘s recantation more persuasive evidence of the defendants‘ 
innocence  than  had  the  Morgan  County  jury.    Even  many  southern 
newspapers  ―rejoic[ed]‖
184  in  the  Court‘s  decision  reversing  Norris‘s 
conviction because, as one of them put it, ―The conscience of the nation and 
the world is convinced that the seven Negroes are not guilty of the crime of 
which they were charged.‖
185 
The  reversal  of  Norris‘s  conviction  need  not  necessarily  have  helped 
Patterson  because  of  the  alleged  procedural  flaw  in  his  appeal.    Yet  the 
justices, after acknowledging Alabama‘s right to dismiss federal claims not 
raised  in  compliance  with  the  state‘s  own  appellate  procedure  rules, 
nonetheless remanded Patterson‘s case to the state court to reconsider in light 
of  Norris.
186  As  justification  fo r  this unprecedented  move, the  justices 
professed themselves unwilling to believe that Alabama judges would have 
condemned Patterson to death because of procedural flaws in his appeal had 
they foreseen that the Supreme Court would soon invalidate the jury-selection 
procedures used in his case.
187 
G.  Subsequent History 
The ILD regarded its victory in the high court as ―another proof of the 
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might of mass pressure and mass protest.‖
188  By contrast, Leibowitz saw it as 
a ―triumph for American  justice and . . . an answer to all those subversive 
elements who seek to engender hatred against our form of government.‖
189  
The  New  York  Times  similarly  declared  that  the  decision  ―shows  that  the 
highest court in the land is anxious to secure and protect the rights of the 
humblest citizens.‖
190 
Governor  D.  Bibb  Graves  of  Alabama  proclaimed  that  the  Court‘s 
decisions were the ―supreme law of the land‖ and that ―we must put the names 
of Negroes in jury boxes in every county.‖
191  He even mailed a copy of the 
rulings  to  all  circuit  judges  in  the  state  with  instructions  to  comply.  
Newspapers outside of the South applauded the governor‘s stance, but in the 
Deep South the reaction was different.  The Charleston News and Courier 
declared  that  putting  blacks  on  juries  was  out  of  the  question  because  it 
―would  revolutionize  Southern  jurisprudence  and  demoralize  Southern 
civilization.‖
192  Thus,  the  Supreme  Court  decision  could  and  would  be 
―evaded.‖
193  Because the Fourteenth Amendment had been ―imposed on the 
South when it was bound hand and foot and gagged . . . [it was] not binding 
upon [the] honor or morals‖ of the South.
194 
The Court‘s second round of Scottsboro reversals did not, as some had 
hoped, deter Alabama from trying again.  Leibowitz endeavored to persuade 
Governor Graves to block further prosecutions, but the Court‘s interventions 
had only further inflamed public opinion in Alabama.  The state‘s high court 
faithfully quashed the indictments but clarified that this would not prevent 
retrials,  and  Lieutenant  Governor  Knight  immediately  announced  that  he 
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would ―prosecute[ the cases] to their conclusion.‖
195 
Meanwhile, organizations supporting the Scottsboro defense  effort were 
beginning  to  quell  their  intramural  divisions.    After  the  Communist 
International  in  1935  decided  to  support  a  popular  front  with  liberal 
organizations  against  the  ―towering  menace  of  fascism,‖  the  ILD  ceased 
attacking NAACP leaders as ―capitalist lackeys‖ and agreed to share control of 
the  Scottsboro  retrials.
196  The ILD,  the NAACP, the  ACLU, and other 
organizations now formed the Scottsboro Defense Committee (SDC), which 
orchestrated the defense for the next round of trials, relegated Leibowitz to the 
background, and enlisted a respected white lawyer from the South to do  most 
of the courtroom work.  For the first time, some Alabama moderates were 
willing to form a state Scottsboro committee, but they resisted affiliating with 
Leibowitz, whose ILD connections and intemperate remarks had thoroughly 
alienated white Alabamians, and they wanted the ILD muzzled.  Even if these 
conditions were satisfied, most of them were not willing to commit themselves 
publicly on the defendants‘ guilt or innocence, and some of them insisted that 
the defendants accept compromise prison sentences.  The Alabama Scottsboro 
Fair  Trial  Committee  that  they  formed  accomplished  little—most  notably, 
failing in efforts to secure a new trial judge and prosecutor.
197 
Late in 1935, a new grand jury in Jackson County, consisting of thirteen 
whites and one black,   returned another indictment against all nine of the 
defendants.    (Alabama  law  required  agreement  by  only  a  two -thirds 
supermajority of the grand jury to return an indictment.)  Early in 1936, 
Patterson was retried.  Twelve blacks appeared on the  hundred-person venire 
from which his trial jury was drawn, but actually getting blacks to serve was 
another matter.  Seven of the prospective black jurors were excused at their 
own request—―looking anything but regretful‖ as they  left the  courthouse, 
according  to  one  newspaper  reporter.
198  The prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to strike the other five blacks from the jury.  Many whites on the 
venire admitted that they believed blacks were biologically inferior, but Judge 
Callahan refused to strike them for that reason.
199 
At the trial, the state concocted new evidence against Patterson, producing 
a prison guard who testified to a supposed confession he had made.  Although 
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the defense demonstrated that it was almost certainly a fabrication, Callahan 
admitted the confession into evidence.  He also obstructed defense counsel at 
every turn, failed to disguise his irritation with them, and glared at Patterson 
while defining the crime of rape.  One prosecutor informed jurors of their duty 
to ―protect the fair womanhood of this great State‖
200 and reminded them that 
after  returning  a  verdict  they  would  have  to  go  home  and  face  their 
neighbors.
201 
Observers were shocked when the jury imposed only a  seventy-five-year 
prison sentence on Patterson.  A Birmingham newspaper called this ―probably 
the first time in the history of the South that a Negro has been convicted of a 
charge of rape upon a white woman and has been given less than a death 
sentence.‖
202  The  jury  foreman  reported  that  he  had  been  convinced  of 
Patterson‘s  innocence,  but  his  colleagues  had  felt  that  an  acquittal  would 
effectively banish them from their communities; the lengthy prison sentence 
was a compromise.
203 
Soon after Patterson‘s conviction, three  of the Scottsboro  defendants—
Norris,  Powell,  and  Roy  Wright—were  in  a  car  returning  them  to  the 
Birmingham jail  when Powell slashed a sheriff  with a knife and then  was 
himself  shot  in  the  head  (though  not  fatally).    Whether  Powell  had  been 
provoked was disputed, though the stabbing was not.  Northern newspapers 
tended to doubt the veracity of the sheriff‘s account that the shooting was in 
self-defense.
204 
By 1936, Alabama officials, reflecting growing public weariness over the 
Scottsboro episode, began hinting at a compromise on sentences less than 
death.  The SDC was reluctant to have the defendants plead guilty to crimes 
they had not committed, but some members worried that the grounds for 
federal appeals were disappearing and that refusing to compromise could lead 
to more death sentences.  A deal was negotiated under which s ome of the 
defendants would be released immediately, while others would be prosecuted 
only for assault and receive sentences of less than five years in prison.  By the 
summer of 1937, editorial opinion in Alabama both supported and predicted a 
compromise solution.  But Judge Callahan blocked it, insisting that the 
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defendants be retried in his courtroom.
205 
Norris went on trial again in Decatur in the summer of 1937, and the jury 
returned another death sentence.  Enlightened public opinion, as reflected in 
newspaper editorials urging a compromise, apparently went unrepresented on 
Morgan County juries.  The prosecutor now hinted that with the convictions 
of the two ―ringleaders of the crime‖—Patterson and Norris—the state was 
prepared  to  compromise.
206  Andy Wright was the next defendant to be 
retried, and the state did not even seek the death penalty.  The prosecutor 
delivered an impassioned attack on New York City, and the jury imposed a 
ninety-nine-year prison sentence.  Next, Charley Weems was re -prosecuted, 
convicted, and sentenced to seventy -five years in prison.  The state then 
dropped the rape charges against Powell and charged him only with assaulting 
the deputy sheriff; he pled guilty and received a twenty -year sentence.  The 
state abandoned its cases against the other four defendants—the two youngest 
and the two most physically disabled at the time of the alleged rapes—and 
they  were  released.    One  observer  wryly  noted  that  this  resolution  left 
Alabama  in  the  ―anomalous  position  of  providing  only  50  per  cent  [sic] 
protection for the ‗flower of southern womanhood.‘‖
207 
Newspapers outside of Alabama treated the dropping of charges against 
the four defendants as a virtual admission that all of the boys were innocent.  
Later in 1937, the Supreme Court, having  exhausted all plausible grounds 
under  the  federal  Constitution  for  reversing  the  Scottsboro  defendants‘ 
convictions, declined to review Patterson‘s seventy-five-year prison sentence.  
The  justices  probably  believed  the  boys  were  innocent,  but  that  was  not, 
unfortunately, a sufficient basis for reversing their convictions.
208 
With grounds for judicial appeals evaporating, the SDC shifted its focus to 
securing a gubernatorial pardon.  Governor Graves agreed that Alabama could 
not justifiably continue to imprison so me of the boys on evidence deemed 
insufficient to hold the others.  Late in 1937, he told the boys‘ representatives 
that he would release them before his term expired.  In the summer of 1938, 
after the Alabama Supreme Court had affirmed the death sentence of Norris 
and the prison sentences of the others, Graves commuted Norris‘s sentence to 
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life imprisonment.  Leading Alabama newspapers now supported clemency 
for  the  remaining  prisoners,  but  the  governor  had  a  last-minute  change  of 
heart and reneged on his promise to free them.
209 
Walter White then went to the White House to ask Eleanor Roosevelt to 
urge the president to intervene.
210  President Roosevelt wrote to Graves, a 
political  supporter,  and  urged  him  to  pardon  the  remaining  Scottsboro 
prisoners.    But  the   governor  had  tested  the  waters  and  concluded  that 
releasing them  would  finish  him politically.  This pattern of  negotiated 
compromise followed by repudiation was repeated several times over the next 
eleven years.  Members of the parole board feared that i f they recommended 
release,  ―some  candidate  may  seize  upon  it  as  an  issue  and  endeavor  to 
discredit the whole parole and probation system.‖
211  Finally, in 1943–1944, 
three  more  of  the  Scottsboro  prisoners  were  released.    But  two  of  them 
promptly  violated the terms  of their parole by  heading North  in search  of 
better employment opportunities, and the prison board threw them back in 
jail.  The last of the Scottsboro prisoners, Andy Wright, was not freed until 
1950.  The nine Scottsboro boys together spent more than 100 years in prison.  
Not  until  1976  had  the  racial  attitudes  of  whites  in  Alabama  changed 
sufficiently for Governor George Wallace to issue an unconditional pardon to 
Norris, which effectively acknowledged his innocence.
212 
IV.  LESSONS 
A.  Long-Term Ramifications 
The Supreme Court‘s interventions probably saved the Scottsboro boys 
from execution, though not from years of wrongful incarceration.  What were 
the broader consequences of these decisions for black criminal defendants in 
the South? 
Justice George Sutherland wrote a narrow opinion in Powell; not only did 
it cover only capital cases, but it was explicitly limited to the circumstances of 
the Scottsboro boys—―the ignorance and  illiteracy  of the  defendants, their 
youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close 
surveillance of the defendants by the military forces.‖
213  In 1942, the Court in 
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Betts v. Brady
214 refused to extend Powell to all indigent felony defendants.  
However, several subsequent decisions held that under certain circumstances, 
such as a defendant‘s youth  or low  intelligence, state-appointed counsel  is 
constitutionally required in felony prosecutions.  Most of these cases involved 
white  defendants  from  northern  states.    The  facts  were  generally  less 
egregious than those in Powell, and the justices usually divided.
215 
Despite these extensions of Powell, the justices said almost nothing about 
the  quality  of  defense  representation  the  Constitution  requires.    The  one 
partial exception was Avery v. Alabama
216 in 1940, where the Court ruled that 
an appointment of counsel three days before a capital murder trial began was 
permissible  unless  the  defendant  could  show  prejudice  resulting  from  the 
shortness of time for trial preparation.  Thus, despite Powell and its progeny, 
southern  blacks  could  be  woefully  underrepresented  without  there  being  a 
constitutional  violation.    And  so  they  were.    Because  the  value  of  most 
constitutional  rights  depends  on  having  competent  lawyers  to  raise  them, 
southern  blacks  benefitted  little  from  those  rights  to  which  they  were 
entitled.
217 
Most black criminal defendants in the South could not afford to hire their 
own lawyers, and thus their fates rested upon court -appointed counsel.  The 
NAACP financed a few cases that its lawyers considered likel y to succeed.  
But the association rarely got involved in criminal litigation until after trial.  It 
had limited funds for such cases, and it did not regard itself as a legal aid 
bureau.  Thus, the NAACP‘s involvement was limited to cases where ―there is 
injustice  because  of  race  or  color  and  where  there  is  a  possibility  of 
establishing  a  precedent  for  the  benefit  of  Negroes  in  general.‖
218  These 
restrictive ground rules led the association to reject many cases of obvious 
racial injustice. 
Even the rare black defendant who could afford to hire a lawyer could not 
be certain that he was getting his money‘s worth.  Very few black lawyers 
practiced  in the South  in the 1930s or 1940s.  The  number  in Mississippi 
declined from twenty-one in 1910 to three in 1940, and the number in South 
Carolina fell from seventeen to five.
219  Outside of major cities, there were 
essentially none.  Furthermore, the few black lawyers who did exist were a 
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distinct  liability  in  most  Jim  Crow  courtrooms,  both  because  of  the  racial 
prejudice of white judges and jurors and because of the inferior legal training 
most of them had received (being barred from southern law schools).
220 
Yet one might at least presume that black lawyers generally would have 
had the best interests of their clients at h eart.  Black defendants never knew 
what they were getting with white lawyers.  To be sure, some white lawyers 
proved  genuinely committed to serving their  clients‘ interests and pursued 
cases without adequate compensation while risking reprisals for representing 
unpopular defendants.  But most white lawyers shared the prejudices of their 
communities,  assumed  their  clients  deserved  whatever  sentences  they 
received, and barely went through the legal motions to collect a fee.
221 
Willie Francis, a sixteen-year-old Louisiana black who was sentenced to 
death for  murdering a white  man, was victimized by this sort of  inept 
lawyering.    Francis  achieved  national  prominence  in  1946 –1947  when 
Louisiana sought to execute him ―by installments‖
222 after the electric chair 
malfunctioned  during the  initial  execution attempt.  At trial, Francis‘s two 
court-appointed lawyers had failed to challenge the all-white jury or to file a 
change-of-venue motion, even though Francis had been transferred to another 
county‘s jail to protect him from threatened mob violence.  Defense counsel 
also failed to object to Francis‘s possibly coerced confession, which was the 
only direct evidence linking him to the crime.  His lawyers made no opening 
argument, called no witnesses, and neglected to inform the jury that the police 
had  ―lost‖  the  alleged  murder  weapon.    Then  they  failed  even  to  appeal 
Francis‘s conviction, thus forfeiting any valid constitutional claims he may 
have had.  Francis may have been innocent of the charge of murder, yet no 
appellate  court  ever  scrutinized  his  trial  record.    His  case  was  unique, 
however, not because of this inept lawyering—which was all too common in 
the trials of indigent southern blacks—but because of the bungled execution 
attempt.  In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, rejected Francis‘s 
claim  that  a  second  execution  attempt  would  constitute  cruel  and  unusual 
punishment  or  violate  due  process.
223  The  justices did not even consider 
whether his trial representation had been adequate.
224 
White lawyers risked severe social sanctions for defending black clients 
too vigorously when local communities were demanding blood.  Most chose 
not to do so.  Sonny Dobbs, a black man charged with murdering a white man 
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in  Attala  County,  Mississippi,  in  1946,  was  defended  by  court-appointed 
whites,  whom  the  NAACP  thought  did  an  excellent  job  under  the 
circumstances.
225  Still,  they  ―lived  in  Mississippi  and  wanted  to  stay 
[t]here‖
226  and  thus  dared  not  take  the  measures  that  were  essential  to  an 
effective defense, such as demanding a change of venue or challenging race 
discrimination in jury selection.  White lawyers who refused to capitulate to 
such  pressure  found  their  legal  practices  crippled,  and  sometimes  they 
suffered physical violence.  In 1939–1940, Joseph Murray ably represented 
two blacks from McCormick, South Carolina, who were accused of murder—
probably falsely.  As a result, Murray reported that he had ―incurred the ill 
will of so many people here that I am now unable to secure any practice and it 
looks as if I might have to move to some other place and begin over to try and 
again build up a practice.‖
227  Stanley Belden, a white ACLU lawyer who in 
1941  conscientiously  represented  a  black  man  facing  possibly  trumped-up 
murder charges in Hugo, Oklahoma, saw his legal practice ruined and was 
forced to leave the state.
228 
Southern  courts  refused  to  extend  Powell  to  require  effective 
representation of indigent defendants.  The justices had ruled that appointment 
of counsel on the morning of trial was inadequate, so southern judges would 
appoint lawyers a few days before trial.  Black defendants whose lives were in 
jeopardy  were  routinely  provided  lawyers  so  near  to  trial  that  no  serious 
investigation of facts or preparation of trial strategy was possible.
229  In the 
most  explosive  case s,  moreover,  court -appointed  lawyers  were  strongly 
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discouraged  from  seeking  continuances  by  threats  to  lynch  their  clients.
230  
Lawyers who persevered against such pressure generally saw their motions 
for continuances denied anyway, or else judges granted mu ch shorter delays 
than they had sought.
231 
Placing blacks on  southern juries probably would have benefitted black 
defendants more than ensuring adequate representation of defense counsel 
would  have.    This  is  why  contemporary  observers  believed  the  jury -
discrimination claim of the Scottsboro defendants was more significant than 
their right-to-counsel argument.
232  Yet, in practice, Norris had little impact on 
black jury service in the South. 
Southern newspapers predicted that Norris would be easily circumvented.  
The  Jackson  (Mississippi)  Daily  News  deemed  the  decision  only  a  minor 
nuisance because lawyers would have to invest time in evading it.
233  In states 
such as Mississippi and South Carolina, where jury service was linked to 
voter  registration,  Norris  made  little  if  any  difference  because  blacks 
remained almost universally disfranchised in the 1930s.
234  Norris also left 
open  the  possibility  of  using  jury-selection  schemes  that  vested  enormous 
discretion  in  the  hands  of  (white)  jury  commissioners.    Proving  race 
 
230. Motion for New Trial, State v. Dobbs (Miss. 1946) (No. 36195), microformed on NAACP 
Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 8, series B, reel 4, frame 305.  
231. E.g.,  RICHARD  B.  SHERMAN,  THE  CASE  OF  ODELL  WALLER  AND  VIRGINIA  JUSTICE, 
1940–1942, at 21–22 (1992) (one–week continuance); Steven F. Lawson et al., Groveland: Florida’s 
Little Scottsboro, 65 FLA. HIST. Q. 1, 11 (1986) (a continuance of a few days granted after a month‘s 
continuance  was  requested);  Letter  from  James  H.  Kimmel,  Jr.,  to  NAACP,  supra  note  229 
(continuance denied to lawyer appointed the day before the trial); Letter from J.C. Bird, Attorney, to 
Roy Wilkins, Editor, CRISIS (Jan. 22, 1940), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 8, 
series B, reel 2, frames 276–78 (continuance denied to lawyer appointed just one week before trial). 
232. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text.  
233. CARTER,  SCOTTSBORO,  supra  note  6,  at  326  (citation  omitted).    For  contemporary 
predictions that Norris would be evaded, see MANGUM, LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, supra note 
13, at 333; BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920, at 
82 (1946) (quoting the ―sober and realistic‖ view of William Pickens of the NAACP); J.F. Barbour, 
Jr., Note, Constitutional Law—Equal Protection of Laws—Exclusion of Negroes from Jury Service—
Effect  on  Defendant’s  Right  to  a  New  Trial,  8  MISS.  L.J.  196,  200–01  (1935);  The  Scottsboro 
Decision, 71 SURVEY 144 (1935) (quoting the Star of Wilmington, North Carolina, which noted after 
Norris that ―it does not follow that Alabama will rush to the fore with mixed juries‖ and predicted 
that the names of blacks might be put on jury rolls but some method would be found for continuing 
to exclude blacks from actual service on juries) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
234. State  v.  Grant,  19  S.E.2d  638,  640–41  (S.C.  1941);  NELSON,  THE  FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT  AND  THE  NEGRO,  supra  note  233,  at  82–83;  Barbour,  supra  note  233, at  201–04; 
Negroes and Jury Service in the Southern States, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 5, 1935, at 8; NEWS & 
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 13, 1935, at 4; see also BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 30, 1935, at 1, 
reprinted in THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTHERN WHITE PRESS TOWARD NEGRO SUFFRAGE 1932–
1940, at 2 (Rayford W. Logan ed., 1940) (noting that after  Norris a bill was introduced into the 
Alabama  senate  that  would  have  limited  jury  service  to  registered  voters);  Editorial,  Alabama 
Undeterred, PITTSBURGH COURIER, Apr. 27, 1935, at 12 (same). 418  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW  [93:379 
discrimination in the administration of such schemes was difficult, especially 
because state courts still made the initial factual determinations.
235 
Southern whites correctly concluded that Norris could be circumvented by 
placing the names of a few blacks on the jury rolls.  Such blacks were often 
superannuated,  dead,  disabled,  or  departed,  and  they  never  appeared  in 
numbers  approximating  the  percentage  of  a  county‘s  black  population.
236  
Even those blacks making it onto the rolls were rarely called for service, and 
if  they  were,  they  could  often  be  intimidated.
237  When a black college 
president in Texas refused to be excused from jury service in 1938, white 
hoodlums removed him from the jury room and threw him head first down the 
steps of a Dallas courthouse.
238  Moreover, the presence of an occasional 
black  on  a  grand  jury  could  be  nullified  by  rules  requiring  only  a 
supermajority, not unanimity, for indictment.
239  The even more occasional 
black called for service on trial juries could be excluded through challen ges 
for cause, over which trial judges exercised enormous discretion, or through 
prosecutors‘  peremptory  challenges,  the  number  of  which  some  states 
increased after Norris.
240 
The most that  Norris seems to have accomplished was to place a single 
black on an occasional jury in large cities of the peripheral South.
241  In the 
Deep South and in rural areas throughout the region, exclusion of blacks from 
juries remained the rule.  In a Louisiana case that reached the Supreme Court 
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in 1939, a rural parish with a black population of nearly 50% had ―complied‖ 
with Norris by placing the names of three blacks, one of whom was dead, on a 
jury venire of 300.
242  A study conducted in 1940 found that the vast majority 
of  rural  counties  in  the  Deep  South  ―have  made  no  pretense  of  putting 
Negroes on jury lists, much less calling or using them in trials.‖
243 
Because  southern  states  reformed  their  jury-selection  practices  so  little 
after Norris, the justices continued to find easy cases for reversing convictions 
on the ground of race discrimination in jury selection.
244  By the late 1940s, 
they were growing frustrated at the inefficacy of their decisions,
245 but they 
still declined to take the steps necessary actually to place blacks on  southern 
juries.  The Court refused to condemn the practices of limiting jury service to 
registered voters
246 or of conferring virtually unfettered discretion over jury 
selection to commissioners.
247  The Court did not even flatly prohibit the 
insidious  practice  of  commissioners  limiting  prospective  jurors  to  t heir 
personal acquaintances—meaning  white  people.
248  In  Akins  v.  Texas
249  in 
1945, the Court inexplicably deferred to a state court‘s finding that there had 
been no race discrimination in jury selection despite the testimony of all three 
jury commissioners that they had refused to permit more than one black to sit 
on Akins‘s grand jury.  The justices declined even to hear a case contesting 
the constitutionality  of prosecutors using peremptory challenges to  exclude 
blacks  from  juries  because  of  their  race.
250  As  a result,  southern  juries 
remained almost entirely white for another generation.  Every one of the 
fifteen black men executed by the border state of Kentucky between 1940 and 
1962 had been convicted of a crime against a white person by an all-white 
jury.
251 
The famous Martinsville Seven case illustrates how the exclusion of 
blacks from jury service invited racial injustice.  Seven young black men were 
charged with raping a white woman in the Southside region of Virginia in 
1949.  The woman had indisputably been raped, and all seven defendants had 
indisputably engaged in forcible intercourse with her or been present as 
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accomplices.  No lynch mob attempted to execute the defendants, and the trial 
was conducted in a mob-free atmosphere.  The defendants were not beaten 
into confessing.  The trials did not occur until five months after the crime, and 
defense counsel was appointed four months before trial.  Both the judge and 
the  prosecutor  avoided  references  at  trial  to  the  defendants‘  race.    Three 
blacks sat on the grand jury that indicted the defendants, and blacks appeared 
in  each  of  the  jury  pools  for  the  six  separate  trials.    Although  black 
newspapers and some radical journalists compared these proceedings to those 
at  Scottsboro  twenty  years  earlier,  the  dissimilarities  are  actually  more 
striking: The Martinsville Seven had real trials with real lawyers that were 
conducted with relative dispassion before a fair judge.
252 
Yet the trials, convictions, and executions of the Martinsville Seven were 
fundamentally unjust for two reasons having to do with race.  First, although 
blacks were in the jury pools for all of the defendants‘ trials, every one of the 
seventy-two jurors who tried and convicted them was white.  Blacks were 
excluded from the juries because of their opposition to the death penalty or 
through the prosecutors‘ use of peremptory challenges.  Second, every one of 
the forty-five death sentences imposed for rape or attempted rape in Virginia 
between  1908  and  1950  involved  a  black  man  and  a  white  woman.  
(Similarly, between 1925 and 1950, Florida executed thirty-three blacks and 
only one white for rape, and in its entire history Mississippi had executed no 
whites for rape.)
253 
Thus, although the Martinsville Seven enjoyed ostensibly fair trials, their 
fate ultimately depended on their race.  In rape cases in Virginia, only blacks 
who assaulted whites ever received the death penalty, and only white jurors 
adjudicated their guilt and imposed sentences.  Oliver Hill, a black lawyer 
from Richmond who helped represent the Martinsville Seven, concluded that 
white Virginians knew that ―[w]e don‘t need to lynch the niggers.  We can try 
them and then hang them.‖
254  Virginia executed the Martinsville Seven  in 
February 1951—the largest mass execution or lynching for rape in American 
history.
255 
Black jurors probably would have benefitted black defendants in other 
cases  as  well,  assuming  their  independent  judgment  could  have  been 
guaranteed (quite possibly an unwarranted assumption in the South of this 
era).    Odell  Waller  was  ano ther  black  Virginian  whose  death  sentence 
attracted national attention.  He was a sharecropper convicted of murdering a 
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white farmer, Oscar Davis, in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, in 1940.  Waller 
had undeniably killed Davis, but he had a plausible self-defense claim.  The 
two men had an unpleasant history, including Davis‘s mutilation of Waller‘s 
dog.    Immediately  before  Davis‘s  death,  they  had  quarreled  over  the 
distribution of crop shares.  Waller claimed that Davis was known to carry a 
gun and that he was reaching for it when Waller shot him.  The all-white jury 
rejected Waller‘s self-defense claim.  How could having blacks on Waller‘s 
jury—one-third  of  Pittsylvania  County‘s  population  was  black—not  have 
made  a  difference?    When  the  race  of  the  defendant  and  decedent  were 
reversed in another sharecropper homicide case in Pittsylvania County around 
the  same  time,  the  all-white  jury  deliberated  just  fifteen  minutes  before 
acquitting  the  defendant,  apparently  crediting  his  self-defense  claim.    Yet 
Governor  Colgate  Darden  repulsed  entreaties  to  commute  Waller‘s  death 
sentence, and he was executed in 1942.
256 
Because most white men in the South presumed that sex between a black 
man and a white woman was rape, black defendants who pleaded consent as a 
defense to charges of raping white women had essentially no chance before 
all-white juries.  Even black defendants who pled mistaken identity might 
have  benefitted  from  having  blacks  on  their  juries.    In  1935,  a  white 
Birmingham physician was quoted as saying that if a black man raped a white 
woman,  ―an  example  and  a  spectacle  of  punishment‖  was  necessary.    ―If 
possible get the right Negro and string him up.  String up one or two of his 
nearest relatives, at the same time.  And if the right one can‘t be found, take 
some other Negro.‖
257  It seems safe to assume that all black jurors would 
have disagreed with that sentiment. 
B.  Why Powell and Norris Were So Inefficacious 
One reason decisions such as Powell and Norris had so little impact is that 
southern black defendants could not ordinarily appeal their convictions and 
sentences.  State appellate and federal judges were more likely than state trial 
judges to vindicate the constitutional rights of southern blacks because they 
were better educated, more professionalized, and more independent of local 
opinion that often proved hostile to those rights.  Yet cases of black criminal 
defendants usually did not proceed beyond trial courts, mainly because state 
provision of counsel to indigents did not generally extend to appeals, but also 
because  procedural  defaults  frequently  insulated  trial  errors  from  appellate 
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review.
258 
The criminal cases that reached the Supreme Court did so only because of 
outside financial assistance.  Incidents such as the racial massacre in Phillips 
County, Arkansas, and the alleged rapes and ensuing trials at Scottsboro 
captured national attention.  Because the criminal trials emerging from these 
incidents revealed Jim Crow at its worst, they afforded outstanding fund -
raising opportunities for the NAACP and the ILD, respectively.  However, the 
NAACP took relatively few criminal cases, and the association was absent 
from most of the rural South and thus could not intervene in cases at the 
moment when it would have done the most good—when the trial record was 
being  created.    Thus,  in  run-of-the-mill  criminal  cases,  indigent  black 
defendants  were  represented  not  by  elite  legal  talent  hired  by  these 
organizations, but by court-appointed lawyers, who could not invariably be 
counted  upon  to  aggressively  defend  their  clients‘  rights  because  of  the 
―personal odium‖ that attached to those challenging ―the venerable system‖ of 
white supremacy.
259 
Furthermore, enlistment of competent counsel on appeal frequently came 
too late to do defendants much good, as inept or carele ss lawyering at trial 
produced procedural defaults that insulated constitutional violations from 
appellate review.  The issue of race discrimination in jury selection was 
procedurally defaulted in both Powell and in Moore (the Phillips County race-
riot case) and was very nearly so in Patterson.
260  In Brown v. Mississippi,
261 
the landmark decision in 1936 holding that criminal convictions based on 
coerced confessions violate due process, that issue nearly failed to gain a 
hearing in the Supreme Court because de fense counsel had challenged the 
voluntariness of the confessions at the wrong point of the trial.  Until the 
Supreme  Court  in  the  1960s  changed  the  rules  regarding  federal  court 
deference  to  state  procedural  defaults,  many  valid  federal  constitutional 
claims were denied a hearing in any appellate court.
262 
The ruthlessness of the Jim Crow system made it difficult for lawyers to 
compile the sort of trial record necessary for effective appellate review.  Fear 
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of economic and physical reprisals deterred all but the most intrepid blacks 
from signing affidavits supporting a change in trial venue.
263  When Walter 
White of the NAACP traveled to Phillips County to investigate the facts that 
gave rise to  Moore,  he  was  nearly  lynched.
264  One of the blacks whom 
Leibowitz had called to testify at the hearing challenging race discrimination 
in jury selection in Morgan County had a cross burnt on his front yard for 
―stepping  out  of  line.‖
265  Rigorous  cross-examination  of  white  witnesses, 
especially  women  in  rape  cases,  not  only  alienated  white  jurors  but  also 
jeopardized the safety of defense counsel.
266 
Finally, public officials in the South had little direct incentive to abide by 
the  constitutional  rights  of  black  defendants  because  civil  and  criminal 
sanctions for violations were generally unavailable.  After  Screws v. United 
States
267 in 1945, it was far from certain whether the justices would permit the 
imposition of federal criminal liability even on sheriffs who beat defendants 
into confessing.
268  Nor was it clear in the 1940s  that courts would construe 
federal civil rights statutes to authorize the imposition of monetary liability on 
public  officers  who  contravened  state  law  as  well  as  the  federal 
Constitution,
269 and every state already required the appointment of counsel 
for  indigent  capital  defendants  and  forbade  race  discrimination  in  jury 
selection.
270 
For all these reasons—the inability of most southern black defendants to 
afford counsel, the relative absence of alternative sources of legal assistance 
such as the NAACP, the difficulty of maneuvering around state procedural 
default  rules,  the  obstacles  to  compiling  a  favorable  trial  record,  and  the 
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absence  of  effective  sanctions  against  rights  violators—few  criminal  cases 
like Powell and Norris reached the Court.  As one black newspaper observed 
after Powell, ―Out of the thousands of cases  where  Negroes are convicted 
without fair trials few ever reach the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and even if they do 
the  results  are  rarely  altered. . . .    We  are  afraid  it  will  take  more  than 
decisions of the Supreme [C]ourt to rectify these flagrant evils of our judicial 
system.‖
271 
C.  Intangible Benefits of Litigation 
Litigation in defense of the rights of southern blacks may have been more 
important for its intangible effects: convincing blacks that the racial status quo 
was malleable, educating them about their rights, helping to mobilize protest, 
and instructing northern whites about the barbarities of Jim Crow.  A social 
movement for racial reform faced intimidating obstacles in the South.  One of 
the most formidable was simply convincing blacks that the status quo of racial 
subordination  was  contingent  rather  than  inevitable.    As  Walter  White 
observed, the NAACP‘s greatest difficulty was ―getting over to the masses of 
our folks the significance of these fights.‖
272 
In theory, black protest could have assumed a variety of forms: migration, 
violent  revolt,  political  mobilization,  economic  pressure,  street 
demonstrations,  or  litigation.    In  practice,  however,  options  were  limited.  
Violent protest would have been suicidal, given overwhelming white physical 
power and the will to use it.  Political protest was unavailable to  southern 
blacks, who remained almost universally disfranchised.  Few southern blacks 
commanded sufficient financial resources to leverage social change through 
economic pressure.  Street demonstrations, which proved so effective in the 
1960s,  were  not  yet  a  realistic  option:  The  South  was  still  too  violent, 
segregation  and  disfranchisement  too  deeply  entrenched,  and  the  threat  of 
national intervention too remote.   As  one black  leader observed, no  doubt 
correctly, a Gandhian strategy of nonviolent protest in the South would have 
led to ―an unprecedented massacre of defenseless black men and women.‖
273  
Only two protest options were realistically available to southern blacks before 
World War II: migration and litigation.  Many hundreds of thousands pursued 
the former; far fewer chose the latter. 
Most civil rights leaders appreciated the limited transformative potential 
 
271. Editorial, The Scottsboro Case, CHI. BEE, Nov. 20, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 797. 
272. Letter  from  Walter  White,  Secretary,  NAACP,  to  Edward  S.  Lewis,  Baltimore  Urban 
League (Sept. 8, 1937), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 3, series A, reel 2, 
frames 818–19; see also KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 162–67, 
284–86. 
273. E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro and Non-Resistance, 28 CRISIS 58, 59 (1924). 2009]  SCOTTSBORO  425 
of litigation given prevailing constraints.  Charles Houston, the principal legal 
strategist  of  the  NAACP  in  the  1930s,  recognized  that  law  ―has  certain 
definite limitations when it comes to changing the mores of a community,‖ 
because ―[i]t is too much to expect the court to go against the established and 
crystallized social customs.‖
274  Yet even if litigation could not ―bring on a 
social revolution,‖ as Ralph Bunche observed,
275 it could advance long-term 
objectives.  Litigation educated blacks about their rights and inspired them to 
challenge the racial status quo.  The NAACP‘s national office wrote letters to 
southern blacks explaining their rights and the obligation of whites to respect 
them.  Some black communities in the South felt so hopeless and isolated that 
for the national office merely to make inquiries on their behalf would ―do a lot 
of good.‖
276  A memorandum by Houston declared that a principal objective 
of litigation should be ―to arouse and strengthen the will of local communities 
to demand and fight for their rights.‖
277 
Houston and his successor at the NAACP, Thurgood Marshall, thought 
that  organizing  local  communities  in  support  of  litigation  was  nearly  as 
important as winning lawsuits.  They frequently made speeches at mass rallies 
while visiting southern communities for court appearances.  ―On occasion,‖ 
one  biographer  writes,  Marshall  ―appears  to  have  been  brought  to  town 
nominally to work on pending litigation but actually to rally the troops.‖
278  
Perceiving the  need ―to back up  our legal  efforts with the required public 
support and social force,‖ Houston referred to himself as ―not only lawyer but 
evangelist and stump speaker.‖
279  Because cases arising from episodes such 
as Scottsboro demonstrated to blacks the importance of binding together in 
self-defense,  they  provided  unparalleled  fund-raising  and  branch-building 
opportunities for the NAACP.  As one black editorialist observed, ―Whatever 
else happens in the Scottsboro case, . . . [i]t has given us one of the greatest 
chances for consolidated action we have had since emancipation.‖
280 
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Litigation  also  provided  southern  black  communities  with  salutary 
examples of the accomplishments and courage of black Americans.  Watching 
a skilled black lawyer subject a white sheriff to a grueling cross-examination 
educated and inspired southern blacks, who virtually never witnessed such 
scenes of blacks confronting whites on an equal footing.
281  Bold and capable 
performances by black lawyers in southern courtrooms seemed to contravene 
the very premises of white supremacy. 
Marshall explained this dynamic in connection with a criminal trial in 
Hugo, Oklahoma, in 1941, where no black lawyer had ever before appeared in 
the courtroom.  Marshall and his white co -counsel, Stanley Belden of the 
ACLU, had agreed that Marshall would cross -examine all  of the police 
officers on the issue of whether the defendant‘s confession had been coerced, 
―because  we  figured  they  would  resent  being  questioned  by  a  Negro  and 
would get angry and this would help us.  It worked perfect.  They all became 
angry at the idea of a Negro pushing them into tight corners and making their 
lies so obvious.‖
282  Marshall continued: 
Boy, did I like that—and did the Negroes in the Court-room 
like  it.    You  can‘t  imagine  what  it  means  to  those  people 
down there who have been pushed around for years to know 
that there is an organization that will help them.  They are 
really  ready  to  do  their  part  now.    They  are  ready  for 
anything.
283 
Litigation may also have raised the salience of the race issue for whites.  
Houston acknowledged that ―[t]he truth is there are millions of white people 
who have no real knowledge of the Negro‘s problems and who never give the 
Negro a serious thought.‖
284  As Bunche noted, ―[c]ourt decisions, favorable 
or unfavorable, serve to dramatize the plight of the race more effectively than 
any  other  recourse;  their  propaganda  and  educative  value  is  great.‖
285  
Criminal  cases  may  have  afforded  the  best  educational  opportunities 
available, as they revealed Jim Crow at its worst—southern blacks, possibly 
or  certainly  innocent  of  the  crimes  charged,  being  railroaded  to  the  death 
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penalty through farcical trials.  As one black newspaper observed, ―No single 
event touching the Negro question in this country has been forced into the 
conscience, the life and the public opinion of the American people as has the 
Scottsboro case.‖
286 
Finally, litigation, when successful, provided blacks with one of their few 
reasons for optimism before World War II.  As one black leader observed in 
1935, even if court  victories produced  little  concrete change, at least they 
―keep open the door of hope to the Negro.‖
287  Roscoe Dunjee, the NAACP‘s 
principal agent in Oklahoma, noted after one such court victory, ―It is just 
such rifts in the dark clouds of prejudice which cause black folk to know that 
a better day is coming by and by.‖
288 
D.  Intangible Harms of Litigation Victories 
Rulings such as Powell and Norris may have produced intangible harms 
as well as benefits.  By 1950 or so, lynchings were nearly obsolete in the 
South,  and  legal  lynchings  had  been  tempered  and  confined  to  narrower 
portions of the Deep South.  Yet nowhere in the South did blacks serve as 
jurors  in  inflammatory  cases  of  alleged  black-on-white  crime.    All-white 
juries applied unwritten substantive liability rules decreeing that only black 
men  could  be  executed  for  raping  white  women  and  only  whites  were 
permitted to kill other whites in self-defense.  Criminal justice outside of the 
Deep South may have acquired a veneer of legitimacy by the 1940s.  The 
justices  could  find  no  constitutional  error  in  cases  such  as  those  of  the 
Martinsville Seven or that of Odell Waller because the trials had ostensibly 
been  fair.    Yet  black  men  were  still  being  executed  under  circumstances 
where whites almost surely would not have been.
289 
Given this state of affairs, one may wonder whether the Court‘s criminal 
interventions  did  not  have  insidious  consequences.    In  landmark  decisions 
protecting the rights of southern black defendants, the justices employed some 
of  their  grandest  rhetoric  about  the  high  court‘s  heroic  role  in  defending 
unpopular minorities from majoritarian oppression.  For example, in 1940 in 
Chambers  v.  Florida,
290  which  extended  Brown  v.  Mississippi‘s  bar  on 
coerced  confessions  to  cover  interrogation  practices  other  than  physical 
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violence,  the  Court  proudly  proclaimed  the  obligation  of  judges  to  ―stand 
against  any  winds  that  blow  as  havens  of  refuge  for  those  who  might 
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because 
they  are  non-conforming  victims  of  prejudice  and  public  excitement.‖
291  
Newspapers  reported  the  decision  in  banner  headlines  such  as,  ―Justices 
Rededicate  Themselves  as  a  Haven  of  Refuge  for  all  Non-Conforming 
Victims  of Public Prejudice.‖
292  A glowing  editorial  in the Nation quoted 
some of the Court‘s rhetoric and basked in the happy ending of Chambers: 
Americans  were  to  ―be  proud‖  because  the  Court  had  freed  ―obscure  and 
humble‖  black  men  who  implicated  no  larger  political  or  economic 
concerns.
293 
Yet  Chambers  apparently  had  little  effect  on  southern  sheriffs,  who 
continued to coerce confessions from black suspects.
294  Nor, as we have seen, 
did rulings such as  Powell and Norris significantly alter Jim Crow justice.  
Were  blacks  clearly  better  off  because  of  rulings  that  had  little  practical 
consequence  for  southern  criminal  justice  but  that  enabled  the  Court  to 
trumpet the  vigilant  defense that judges  offered against racial prejudice  in 
law?    Before  the  Court‘s  interventions,  at  least  everyone  could  see  mob-
dominated trials for what they were—farcical substitutes for lynchings.  After 
such  rulings,  however,  casual  observers  might  have  been  misled  into 
believing,  along  with  the  New  York  Times,  that ―the  high  court  stands  on 
guard with flaming sword over the rights of every one of us.‖
295 
Blacks could be excused if they demurred from such sentiments.  Even in 
states such as Virginia, where the formal requirements of due process were 
more attentively observed, blacks did not sit on juries in racially explosive 
cases, and all-white juries applied informal liability rules that discriminated 
against blacks.  In the postwar period, the Court had opportunities to redress 
such injustices.  Defendants appealed to the Court cases that challenged the 
racially  motivated  use  of  peremptory  challenges  by  prosecutors  and  racial 
disparities in the administration of the death penalty.  The  justices refused 
even to grant review.
296  Not until the 1970s would the Court invalidate the 
discriminatory administration of the death penalty,
297 and not until the 1980s 
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would it forbid the race-conscious use of peremptory challenges.
298  Yet the 
rhetoric of  Chambers  suggests  that  the  justices  believed  they  had  already 
taken enormous strides toward eliminating race discrimination from southern 
criminal justice.  They had not.  Their accomplishments were fairly trivial—
more a change in form than in substance.  To the extent that the justices and 
their admirers were deluded into thinking otherwise, these criminal rulings 
may have caused actual harm to the interests of southern blacks.
299 
The Court‘s refusal to review a case technically does not indicate approval 
of the lower court‘s decision (though it may imply this, given the  justices‘ 
self-proclaimed role as heroic defender of minority rights).  Yet this Court did 
not simply fail to intervene against certain racial inequalities in the criminal 
justice system of the South; it actually affirmed unjust convictions.  In Akins 
v. Texas in 1945, each of the jury commissioners had admitted his intention to 
limit the number of blacks per grand jury to one, yet somehow the  justices 
found the record unclear on this point.  Moreover, Akins had an especially 
compelling case for reversal of his murder conviction because his self-defense 
claim  almost  certainly  would  have  prevailed  had  he  been  white.    Yet  the 
justices affirmed his death sentence.
300  Lyons v. Oklahoma
301 in 1944 was the 
most atrocious coerced confession case since Brown v. Mississippi; the record 
contained convincing testimony by several whites that Lyons, a black man, 
had been savagely beaten with a blackjack for several hours in an effort to 
obtain his confession.
302  Lyons, too, had a strong claim of innocence.  Yet the 
justices  decided  to  defer  to  the  jury‘s  determination  that  Lyons‘s  second 
confession, obtained just twelve hours after his brutal beatings had ended, was 
voluntary.  For anyone convinced by the Chambers rhetoric, the force of the 
claims by Lyons and Akins that they had been unjustly treated was necessarily 
diminished.  A Court serving as a ―haven[] of refuge for . . . [the] helpless, 
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weak, . . . or . . . non-conforming victims of prejudice‖
303 would surely have 
intervened on behalf of these defendants had their claims been meritorious.  
But their claims were meritorious.  By affirming their convictions, the Court 
probably helped legitimize the unjust treatment of black criminal defendants. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It was no accident that modern American criminal procedure was born in 
cases involving southern black defendants.  For the Supreme Court to begin 
seriously monitoring the state criminal process required a departure from 150 
years‘ worth of tradition and legal precedent grounded in federalism concerns.  
The  justices  were  not  prepared  to  take  that  step  in  cases  of  marginal 
unfairness, but only where the trial had been a complete sham.  Such legal 
travesties  occurred  most  frequently  in  the  South  in  cases  involving  black 
defendants charged with interracial rape or murder. 
The  state-imposed  death  penalty  in  such  cases  was  little  more  than  a 
formalization of the lynching process.  The purpose of a mob-dominated trial 
was simply to avoid a lynching, and the purpose of a lynching was as much to 
ensure black subordination as it was to punish guilt.  The southern appellate 
courts  and  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  applied  different  paradigms  when 
reviewing such trials.  Southern courts saw praiseworthy progress in the mere 
avoidance  of  lynchings.    By  contrast,  Supreme  Court  justices  expected 
criminal  trials  to  be  about  adjudicating  guilt  or  innocence,  not  simply 
preempting a lynching. 
The trials in such cases were so egregiously unfair that national public 
opinion probably endorsed the Court‘s interventions.  Even within the South, 
these rulings had many supporters, as they simply bound southern states to 
behavioral norms that they usually had embraced on their own.  Thus, these 
early  criminal  procedure  rulings  probably  do  not  represent  the  sort  of 
countermajoritarian  judicial  decision  making  one  often  associates  with 
landmark decisions such as Mapp
304 or Miranda
305; it is more accurate to see 
them  as  the  Court  imposing  a  national  consensus  on  recalcitrant  outliers.  
Indeed,  southern  state  courts  themselves  might  have  rectified  the  obvious 
injustices  involved  in  these  cases  had  the  circumstances  been  slightly 
different.  In the early decades of the twentieth century, southern courts had 
become more committed to procedural fairness, even in cases involving black 
defendants  charged  with  serious  interracial  crimes.    Yet  in  cases  that 
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generated  outside  criticism  of  the  South  or  that  were  perceived  to  pose 
broader challenges to white supremacy, southern appellate courts regressed.  
Cases that might otherwise not have reached the U.S. Supreme Court slipped 
through  the  state  system  uncorrected  and  thus  provided  the  occasion  for 
landmark criminal procedure rulings. 
Considered against the backdrop of  the Court‘s other contemporaneous 
race decisions, these early criminal procedure rulings demonstrate that not all 
Jim Crow measures were of a piece.  During this era, the Court unanimously 
affirmed  the  constitutionality  of  public  school  segregation,
306  the  white 
primary,
307 and the poll tax.
308  The justices apparently thought it was one 
thing to segregate and  disfranchise blacks and  quite another to  execute 
possibly innocent blacks after farcical trials. 
Finally, evaluating the consequences of decisions such as  Powell  and 
Norris is complicated.  The Court probably saved the lives of the Scottsboro 
boys, but it could not protect them from unjust prison sentences.  The more 
the Court intervened on their behalf, the more determined white Alabamians 
seemed to punish them.  Thus, despite two Supreme Court rulings in their 
favor, the Scottsboro boys each served from five to twenty years in prison for 
crimes they did not commit. 
In terms of broader effects, the rulings proved disappointing.  The quality 
of  defense representation  for indigent southern blacks did  not significantly 
improve as a result of Powell, and few if any blacks sat on southern juries as a 
result of Norris.  The litigation producing these and other decisions may have 
had intangible benefits for the civil rights movement: teaching blacks about 
their rights, convincing them that racial change was possible, helping them to 
organize,  and  educating  whites  about  the  atrocities  of  Jim  Crow.    But  by 
implying that the Court had effected meaningful changes in southern criminal 
justice when in fact it had not done so, decisions such as Powell and Norris 
may also have harmed southern blacks by lending legitimacy to a system that 
remained deeply oppressive. 
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